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East Europe

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Former Czar Simeon Outlines His Plans

91BA0737A Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian 6 May 91 p 5

[Interview with Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha by Yosif Davidov; place and date not given: "'If I Return, I Know Precisely What Can Be Done'"]

[Text] [Davidov] Your Majesty, data were published in our country according to which 41.2 percent of Bulgarians express their "approval" of you, 22.3 percent "disapprove," and 36.5 percent "have no opinion." Would you comment on those figures?

[Simeon] Few sociological studies should be accepted at face value. I believe that the 36.5 percent who "have no opinion" are the most interesting objects of consideration. I am not a "political personality" (the question in the survey was about the attitude toward political personalities—author), but find that these people should be provided information so that they may form an opinion.

String of Problems

[Davidov] POGLED has drawn up a list of the most pressing issues affecting Bulgarian society today. Let us record your opinion about concerns affecting the ordinary Bulgarian people.

We went down the list, assuring our interlocutor that many people in our country have lost faith and need specific words. We dared to hint that, despite the problems involving paper and the cost of printing, POGLED continues to enjoy a good reputation.

[Simeon] Yes, I know that. Many people share that idea about your newspaper, for which reason I shall answer your questions. Let us get on with it.

[Davidov] The files...

[Simeon] I believe that this phenomenon does not apply to Bulgaria alone but may be noted in all countries of the former socialist camp. The same thing always happens after totalitarianism because the regime concealed from the people what it was doing. The question now is to act properly, to clarify matters, and not to seek vengeance but to trace the events democratically and legally and reach the truth.

[Davidov] The court trials...

[Simeon] I cannot judge because I have insufficient information. However, it is clear that, if we have decided to become a law-governed European state and if we wish to prove that we have indeed undertaken the building of a free, democratic and law-governed society, the trials should be serious so that the judges and the people in charge of such an exceptionally difficult task may act in a free, democratic, and entirely legal way.

[Davidov] The Turkish language...

[Simeon] Many people are concerned. I keep getting letters, telephone calls, and appeals. This may be a

consequence of what was done in the recent past with the Muslim community. The people have become more sensitive, and problems seem to them to be more important than they really are. If we look around, we can see that there are countries that are multilingual, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Great Britain, and Spain. Multilingualism probably makes daily administrative work more difficult. However, this is a historical tradition. It seems to me that these are cultural problems, and I do not see why their significance should be exaggerated, particularly now, when there are so many problems that are more pressing and more serious. Let me also remind you that it is a question of no more than 10 percent of the Bulgarian population. Should the remaining 90 percent be all that concerned with it? Obviously, what are needed, above all, are calm and wisdom.

[Davidov] Impoverished culture...

[Simeon] Wherever I go—the United States, Italy, France, England—I unfailingly read in the press that a deputy, an actor, a writer, or a professor is complaining about the lack of funds for culture. I think that is the case everywhere. It is absolutely clear that we must now pay attention to what is most important: food, supplies, medicines, fuel, and electric power. Our people have very high cultural standards, which is a guarantee that our culture will not be neglected and forgotten. The faster we settle our economic situation, the faster we shall be able to take a more practical look at culture. What I am about to say may shock some people: We should look at ourselves in the mirror and see our real size and understand our significance within a peaceful, tranquil, and united Europe. It may be appropriate to slowly reduce our defense budget or join other countries in solving certain problems and channel into culture the money thus saved.

[Davidov] The rumors...

[Simeon] I feel that, of late, there has been too much trust in rumors. It turning into some kind of illness. In a command society, in which no information is shared, the existence of rumors is logical because everyone is eager to express himself. The danger, however, is that people believe even the most incredible rumors. Let me give you a recent example that made me laugh. It was being said that Lyuboslav Penev, a Valencia soccer player, had developed a special relationship with Kalina, my daughter. That is very touching, but the two have never even met. Furthermore, my daughter knows nothing about soccer.

[Davidov] The energy crisis, nuclear power plants...

[Simeon] The problem is very serious because it is a question of prices and of our adapting to international rather than political (as had been the case so far) prices. It is also a question of priorities. Yes, in our country the question of nuclear power plants is very topical and a matter of concern. However, is it possible to close down the plants immediately, considering that we do not have the funds to buy oil. I think it is impossible to cope

simultaneously with everything and attack on all fronts. It seems to me that problems should be resolved one at a time, taking into consideration foreign experience and seeing the way others have acted in similar situations. Naturally, the topic of nuclear energy, particularly after Chernobyl, has concerned everyone. What is important, however, is to determine which problem has priority: whether the country should sink into darkness and everything grind to a halt, whether to make the nuclear power plants function properly, or whether to acquire other sources of energy. With the help of specialists, a national consensus should be reached on this priority problem.

I Have a Careful Program

[Davidov] I would like to ask you a question that may be somewhat unethical....

[Simeon] It is only the answer and not the question that can be unethical....

[Davidov] All right. What, specifically, are you doing for Bulgaria? In our country, it is as though there is too much talk along the lines of "it is being said..." and "the people say that..."

[Simeon] We do not have nine or 10 hours to give you an answer to that question; some 40 years of activity devoted to Bulgaria cannot be compressed into a single interview.

Anyway, time and results will show what Czar Simeon is doing and what he can do. That will become clear the moment Czar Simeon has the floor and is able to work and act in Bulgaria and not outside it.

As long as I remain outside the country, I shall do what I want, what I know, and what I believe is worth doing for Bulgaria. No one can judge the amount of time I spend or the sacrifices I make.

If I were to return, I know precisely what could be done. At that point, you would hear my program, computed to the second, in the greatest detail! As long as there is no proper democracy so that I could return to Bulgaria, I shall act as I have acted so far!

The Turnovo Constitution

[Davidov] It seems that a crisis is brewing in our country. Do you consider that preliminary general elections, preceding the Grand National Assembly, would result in a new constitution and resolve Bulgaria's problems?

[Simeon] The word "crisis" alarms and frightens people. The changes demanded by the people, the stressful social relations, and the tension are logical consequences of the political situation of the past. I would say that most of the "crises" are inevitable steps in such a transitional time, a time when both people and society must change. However, it is not a question of "crises" but of moments. The people's representatives will favor new elections and

determine whether they have completed the tasks they have undertaken to carry out during their terms, which, actually, will expire at the end of the year. Therefore, this will depend on the people, on public opinion, and on the parties. It is they that will determine whether there should be preliminary elections for yet another Grand National Assembly—it is obvious that the new assembly should also be grand inasmuch as a number of unresolved serious problems remain.

[Davidov] What about the constitution?

[Simeon] Let me share with you something I have not made sufficiently clear so far. Against the background of the difficult and urgent problems affecting the daily lives of the people, when there is a frame—a good, strong frame such as the Turnovo Constitution, such a concise and clear constitution (regardless of whether it favors a monarchy or not; I am referring to the laws)—why should we speculate and lose time in order to develop something seemingly brand-new? Actually, if we are to consider justice, fairness, and democracy, there are not that many new inventions that are possible under the sun and on the earth. It is simply a question of applying what works. If the Constitution in Belgium is still working (the Turnovo Constitution is actually identical to it), and if it worked for Bulgaria (naturally, it should be revised; that is what gives life to a constitution), why should it not work now?

We should then ask ourselves whether the people have an interest in or practical reasons for the monarchy to be the solution to the present, rather confused situation.

In my view, the Turnovo Constitution is an excellent instrument. However, that is a matter for the people to resolve. It is the people who must speak out, or else the people's representatives must determine whether the very process of change in Bulgaria would be accelerated if the world were to learn that Bulgaria had decided to adopt a representative, democratic, and fully constitutional monarchy. It seems to me that this would categorically and clearly emphasize to Western authoritative circles and public opinion that Bulgaria is in a hurry to change from what it has been so far.

People with republican beliefs, for whom I logically feel respect for their tolerance for anything that is constitutional and democratic, would object that a president could also work very well. I agree. Perhaps, however, a republic would be more like the one that existed for the past 45 years (although it was not a republic in the true sense of the word) than would a monarchy. Whatever he may be doing, the president, nonetheless, would come from a party or a group, whereas the king would not. In such a difficult time, the monarchy has greater flexibility. It is more practical. I am not speaking about myself. All I want to say is that a constitutional monarchy offers a number of practical advantages. I have done a great deal of reading on this subject, and I would like to ask some of our political personalities to also read history.

[Davidov] How would the people benefit if a constitutional monarchy were to be approved in Bulgaria?

[Simeon] That would become clear then. For the time being, the people are looking at a republic; let them consider a monarchy as well.

[Davidov] What would you say about the new "problem" of whether the lion should have a crown on its head?

[Simeon] It is precisely such things that indicate that greater attention is being paid to prejudices than to the glorious past. From the very beginning, the lion has had a crown. Look at Hungary. The Hungarians have a huge crown on their coat of arms and are not ashamed of it, and, to the best of my knowledge, Hungary is a wonderful republic. It is regrettable that there should be speculation about a thing such as that rather than about the things that would improve the lot of the people and upgrade the standard of living of the population. That is the main issue and not whether the little lion on the coat of arms should or should not have a crown on its head.

Political Generosity and Farsightedness

[Davidov] Do you think the Bulgarian people could emerge from the tunnel if we can reach a national consensus on the resolution of priority problems?

[Simeon] I do not "think" it; I am convinced of it. However much all of us have dreamed of democracy and freedom and for everyone to be a member of any party he wishes—even more so in the case of our people—that is not enough. The political parties would provide a wonderful example to the people, to the world, and to history if, in considering important problems, they were to be guided exclusively by Bulgaria's and the people's interests and not by party maneuvering and...tricks.

It seems to me that the so-called narrow party interests should be relegated to times when there are no pressing issues, and when a person allows himself the luxury of looking for problems, correcting faults, criticizing, and seeking arguments for an electoral campaign. When many things are going poorly, however, and when the situation is exceptionally difficult, the parties should be concerned, above all, with Bulgaria's well-being.

I am absolutely convinced that the members of the opposition, who have endured such hardships but who have clear democratic convictions, could make a gesture at the altar of the fatherland. Furthermore, the people who have so far been in command and who, to a certain extent, are to be blamed for the present situation should help correct it.

[Davidov] We are finally tempted to ask a strictly professional question: What is Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha's view of the Bulgarian press?

[Simeon] I can only voice my regret about "economizing" in the information media and the consequences of the paper crisis and high production costs. Beyond that,

let me say that the Bulgarian press pleases me. After so many years of reading only the existing official organs, the physical and ideological variety of the press today impresses me. It seems to me that it is in this way that the people will become accustomed to democracy and realize the meaning of freedom and the value of better information. It is becoming clear that, despite the difficulties, there is a fervent desire to do new things and present new ideas. Everyone will win from this, both readers and the country.

Role of Economic Unit of State Security

91B107401 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 3 May 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Dimitur Statkov: "Why Was the Full Truth About the Fourth Directorate of State Security Concealed?"]

[Text] The structure of the former DS [State Security] was debated in a recent "Reaction" program on Bulgarian television. It was discussed by none other than two MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officials, one of whom was high ranking, who demonstrated their penchant for verbosity. This is a fact that, in itself, excludes the presumption of any violation of the Law on State Secrets, which makes this topic worthy of further discussion.

I assume that many people have been left with the impression that, when matters came to a discussion of the DS Fourth Directorate, there would be a slight hitch in providing specifics about its name and tasks. In the final account, it was described simply as "technical," which settled the matter. Actually, what was concealed?

Let us go somewhat back into history (without going into detail). The Fourth Directorate of State Security was developed as an autonomous structure within the DS system in 1952-53. Initially, it was housed in a separate building in the immediate proximity of the ministry itself. Its first chief was Colonel Zafirov (later chief of the Stara Zagora Okrug MVR Directorate). The Fourth Directorate was established for the purpose of serving the country's economy. In 1954 it was disbanded and reorganized as the Fourth Department of the Third DS Directorate, commanded by Colonel Sabotinov. The chief of the directorate itself was Major General Bogdan Dumkov. In the 1960's, the Third Directorate became the notorious Sixth Directorate, and the economic department was placed under the Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), the task of which was the struggle against economic espionage and subversion. In 1986 its autonomy was restored and, once again, it became the Fourth Economic Directorate (and not the Fourth Operative-Technical Directorate, as it represented itself to us; the Fourth Operative-Technical Directorate was a separate service.) Until it was disbanded in 1990 (by General Atanas Semerdzhiev), it was commanded by Lieutenant General Kiril Velichkov, who was subsequently pensioned off.

This brief information is not self-seeking because one day it may become necessary to provide valuable information on such a topical problem, something we leave for the end.

After Todor Zhivkov's "historical letter" of 1988 on the need to wage an uncompromising struggle against economic crime and corruption, the economic militia became energized. As a result, substantial exposures followed (but were poorly publicized) on violations of the law committed by the high-ranking economic and administrative *nomenklatura*. In some cases, matters were taken to court, such as on the allocation of housing in the rayon councils, the appropriation of funds in enterprises in particularly large amounts, theft and negligence, bad deals with foreign partners, the lack of accountability, and so forth. It is thus that the dealings of both the higher economic and the party *nomenklatura* become apparent. Some control had to be established concerning compromising data and secrecy, and it was probably this that made it necessary in 1986 to restore the Fourth Directorate as an autonomous unit. Together with the Sixth Directorate, one of its tasks was to "handle" the higher economic echelon. Thus, the data collected by the economic militia were taken over, and cases demanding a "more special" approach were transferred to the Fourth DS Directorate, where such information could be better kept under control by those to whom it is reported, for purposes of political expediency. It was thus that, after the Sixth Directorate, which was the ideological pillar of the regime, the Fourth Directorate became its economic backbone and screen.

The Fourth Directorate, (and not the Fourth alone), keeps an eye also on the activities of mixed foreign companies and on the entire foreign trade, which are channels along which many millions of leva have been drained. On the basis of the two simple truths that the economy is largely politics and that, at that time, party and state were one, we can easily surmise that, in this case, it was a question of protecting the narrow party interests of the former BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. Any failure of cadres could also damage that party's reputation. That is why the Fourth Economic Directorate was largely used as a screen. This is not to say that it did not include conscientious and capable personnel (as is the case with the respective departments of today's NSZK [National Service for the Defense of the Constitution]). In practice, however, permission "from above" frequently had to be obtained in order to proceed with a deal and to conclude it. In most cases, however, the people did their work by themselves and without any special instructions. However, once the collected data and reports were sent to the superior power echelons, they became lost among the files for reasons of political expediency. Furthermore, in the summer of 1988, an extensive report stamped "strictly confidential" was drafted, informing the highest levels about the alarming and even critical condition of the national economy. However, there was no reaction to the report. Also reported were the failures of the Radomir KTM [expansion unknown] and the Kremikovtsi MK [Metallurgical

Combine], and the danger of a major accident in Devnya (which indeed did take place!).

Therefore, we can see a "strange" dependence: Along with the restoration of the Fourth Economic Directorate of the DS, the headlong collapse of our economy and the accelerated accumulation of foreign debt began. It is interesting to see how this could have taken place when it was supervised by such a vigilant service!?

Bulgarleasing Issues Dividends to Investors

91B40765A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
13 May 91 p 2

[Report by Ivan G. Ivanov: "Declamations Remained Outside the Hall...."—first paragraph is DELOVI SVYAT introduction]

[Text] The Bulgarleasing AF distributed among stockholders dividends of 11 percent on investment in leva and 8 percent in dollars, based on a 30-percent "net" privatization.

More than 27 million leva of the actual 43 million leva paid-up stockholding capital (with 40 million leva statutory capital) was represented in Hall No. 11 of the NDK [People's Palace of Culture] on the day Bulgarleasing AF held its general stockholders' meeting. In attendance were 352 state, 12 foreign, and 77 private companies and individuals and six commercial banks.

The figures quoted in the report by Dimitur Tadarukov, the director general, based on the 1990 balance sheet, the reports of the company's control council, and so on, confirm that leasing is a promising and profitable form of private enterprise in Bulgaria. This applies to the present, or, let us say, it especially applies to the present. Last year Bulgarleasing AF showed a 189.7-percent increase in income, as compared to 1989, and please note that profits increased by 14.5 million leva, or 205.7 percent, as compared to the same period of the preceding year.

As one of the stockholders joked, two or three years ago this would have led to congratulatory statements, speeches, labor banners in the hall, orders and medals, and perhaps even a concert. Now the stockholders merely reviewed the resolution passed at their previous general meeting and raised the dividends on their investments (average annual use) from 9 percent to 11 percent in leva and 8 percent in dollars, as compared to the current bank deposits, which pay 6.5-percent interest.

They showed no inclination for banners and recitations or other moral incentives.

Actually, Bulgarleasing AF could have paid dividends of up to 12.4 percent on investment in leva. However, it preferred to capitalize the 1.4-percent difference in favor of the company, which has interesting plans for its future. Last year, the biggest share in its overall income was that of trade and services (41.3 percent) and of

international leasing (28.8 percent). Commercial operations contracts with foreign partners (Germany, the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, England, and so forth) amounted to 17 million leva. Along the line of international leasing, machines and equipment for light industry and the chemical, cellulose, and paper industries and transportation were imported, as well as consumer goods worth about \$30 million. Goods produced with the leased equipment, worth more than \$9 million, were exported to Western Europe, and the funds were used to make the leasing payments (the so-called *vu-vax* operations, as known to financial people) and, naturally, to pay the stockholders.

These areas will continue to be developed. Privatization is given priority in the plans. Without any lyrical asides, it was stated that, by attracting new stockholders and by other means, efforts were made to achieve a structure with 30-percent participation by private companies and individuals, 20 percent by foreign physical and juridical persons, 15 percent by various cooperatives and organizations, and 35 percent by state firms. As we can see, even if we were to qualify the anticipated participation of cooperatives as state participation, privatization would still reach at least 50 percent. Therefore, Bulgarleasing AF could become an example of a truly mixed form of ownership, which is a rarity in the country.

For the future, the firm contemplates joint projects with the International Finance Corporation (the financial corporation of the World Bank) and the EC in the area of the FAR program and other initiatives, joint structures in Germany, Thailand, Switzerland, and the USSR, a factoring company jointly with British and Belgian businesses, and so forth. In most cases, the term "this will be a first for Eastern Europe" will apply. The explanation for this kind of interest on the part of foreign businessmen and financiers is simple: Very advantageous conditions for leasing are developing in Bulgaria, and we have a company that has invested in excess of \$200 million within a relatively short time, without any banking or state guarantees, and is doing well.

It is true that matters are confused at present. Considering the high basic interest rates paid in the country, the substantial rate of inflation, the present level of taxation, and so on, companies and private individuals are, to use the metaphor of a businessman, sinking to their waists, and some to above their waists and even over their heads. The bottom still cannot be touched. The hardships are shared equally by all. In the way that leasing was practiced until recently, the present confused situation would have destroyed the very concept of it. The

central-planning economic system never restricted or prohibited it. However, it also did not create the necessary legal foundation or conditions for the application of contemporary leasing technologies. Actually, leasing had preserved the features of the entrepreneurial form from which it originated (leasing, renting machines and equipment under specific conditions).

Today the situation is somewhat different. The high interest rate, for example, is a circumstance that makes leasing activities more difficult, without being fatal. If we use the so-called rollover (that is, extending the leasing contract or redrafting it under different circumstances and a "floating" rate), it would not be impossible for the partners to even benefit from the high interest rate. That is only one of the "tricks" professionals have mastered by the dozen.

That is why shares of Bulgarleasing AF would have been quoted as high on our securities market—if we had such a market instead of merely taking our first steps toward one. That would be a rating that would ensure the sale of stock of nominal 1,000-leva value for 2,000 leva, which would make both the statements and those who make such statements totally unnecessary.

However, it is precisely at this point that a feature is concealed, which makes me skeptical about the success of this business in Bulgaria.

In all economic systems and in all countries, there have always been people who justify their poor financial and material condition by blaming shortfalls in society rather than themselves. It is very easy to ascribe to the totalitarian or to the market economy the fact that someone may be lacking industriousness, curiosity, honesty, steadfastness, skill, patience, and professionalism. Such people provide a fertile environment for the blossoming of envy, populism, and the whipping up of malicious public frenzy.

I am not about to claim that right now there are few such people in Bulgaria or that they do not profit from the existing ulcers within society, such as black marketeering, corruption (including "money-making"), a prejudiced rendering of reciprocal services, and so on, for the sake of slandering honest and worthy businessmen. Actually, if someone were to ask me what is more dangerous today, to suffer because of the crisis or to succeed in business despite the crisis, I would be unable to answer. Declamations and declaimers were kept outside Hall No. 11 of the NDK. Bulgarleasing AF be careful!

Foreign Ministry: Concern at Yugoslav Events

LD2806130991 Prague CTK in English 1146 GMT
28 Jun 91

[Text] Prague June 28 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Egon Lansky today issued a statement expressing concern about the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia since Slovenia and Croatia declared independence last Tuesday.

The statement calls on all the sides concerned to show utmost restraint and to exert maximum effort to solve the dispute through negotiations in accord with international law, the procedures agreed upon within the Helsinki Process and democratic principles.

An emergency group has been set up at the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to follow the developments in Yugoslavia and to respond to them as necessary, the statement says.

Slovak Leaders Congratulate SFRY Republics

LD2806073191 Prague CTK in English 2051 GMT
27 Jun 91

[Text] Bratislava June 27 (CTK)—The chairmen of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and Slovak National Party [SNS], Jan Carnogursky and Jozef Prokes, have sent congratulatory messages off to the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia upon their declarations of independence.

Carnogursky, who is Slovak premier but who sent the identical telegrams to the two breakaway republics in his capacity as KDH leader, described the declarations of independence and sovereignty as an expression of majority popular will in the republics as confirmed in referendums.

"Such a decision is in the hands of every sovereign nation and is an expression of its right to self-determination according to international law," Carnogursky wrote. He wished the two republics "success in building their statehood by democratic means" and "peaceful coexistence" for all the nations of Yugoslavia.

Carnogursky sent the telegrams to the premiers of Slovenia and Croatia, Lojzije Peterle and Josip Manolic.

The KDH's stated policy on Czechoslovakia's own setup is that Slovakia should remain a part of the Czechoslovak federation at present but become a sovereign nation of Europe at some point in the future.

SNS Chairman Jozef Prokes congratulated the leaders of the two Yugoslav republics and assured them that "SNS parliament deputies will do everything for the international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia."

The SNS favors Slovak independence.

National Liberals for Slovene, Croatian Stand

AU0107181491 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Slovak 27 Jun 91 p 2

[CTK report in the "Briefly" column]

[Text] The National Liberals support the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence. P. Weiss, the National Liberals executive secretary, made this statement at yesterday's press briefing in Bratislava. In this connection, he said that the National Liberals are in favor of an independent Slovakia and support all political and constitutional steps leading toward this.

Czech Right-Wing Parties in Slovak View

91CH06561 Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
13 Jun 91 pp 4-5

[Article by Marian Lesko: "This Czech Right Wing of Ours"]

[Text] Just about two weeks ago the Caucus of Right-Wing Parties and Movements held five meetings in Brno. Thanks to this fact we know that presently 17 (seventeen) political entities in Bohemia and Moravia profess a right-wing orientation. True, not everyone claiming allegiance to the right wing is lucky enough to have the right wing embrace him, which for instance is the case of Dr. Sladek. The caucus participants made it clear to him—even though at a distance—that his kind of right-wing politics seemed to them "rather peculiar." They dusted off earlier statements by Vaclav Klaus on a democratic right wing, parties of a non-Sladek type and the like. But even as they chased the good doctor out of the corral, the offered spectrum of "right-wingisms" remained extraordinarily broad. Yet it turns out that few are likely to pick and choose from among them. Most people inclining toward the right will choose from among several already established groups—ODS [Civic Democratic Party], ODA-KAN [Civic Democratic Alliance—Club of Nonaligned Activists], KDS [Christian Democratic Party], or perhaps consider how to express their sympathies for Jiri Kotas. The others will evidently have to wait a little longer for their opportunity.

Personnel changes in the Czech National Council, the Czech government and most recently in the presidium of the federal parliament have suggested that it is particularly the Civic Democratic Party which is "on the roll" since its people have advanced to high posts and offices. It is a party with forty deputies in the Federal Assembly [FZ] and according to a public opinion poll is supported by 17 percent of the population. And on top of that it has Vaclav Klaus. But some say it should be seen the other way around. Because Vaclav Klaus enjoys popular support in Bohemia and Moravia he has become owner of a party with the second largest number of deputies in the FZ, and that's why "sharp guys" are coming to take up offices and posts. The truth most likely will be somewhere in between. Few political leaders and political parties had such luck finding one another as Vaclav

Klaus and his Civic Democratic Party. And if through its chairman the ODS claims the role of the integrating party on the right wing it is not a lack of modesty but rather affirmation of the true state of affairs.

Party As Personnel Elevator

When at the ODS constituent congress the conservative Mr. Kotas who attended as a guest was asked what he thought of the founding of a rival political party, he said that no new party was founded but that one segment of the old Civic Forum [OF] preserved itself under a new name. Thus survived a segment which for reasons of expediency moved to the part of the "raft" still barely remaining above water. Thus the nucleus of ODS consists of paid functionaries and occupants of the existing OF structures.

There is general agreement that the personnel base of the new right-wing party consists of ambitious people between 30 and 45 years of age, especially those who under the past regime for various reasons (not necessarily always political) failed to attain positions commensurate with their expectations—as rank-and-file citizens they were imbued with strongly antisocialist views by the Communist regime. And so although prior to November 89 many did not display any particular interest in politics, it is a wholly different matter now. Ambitious people see an opportunity for rapid rise, provided of course that the party will score one victory after another and that the former reformers, former dissidents and liberals presently in office will be defeated. From their perspective ODS is the personnel elevator party and they share in common the desire to see the elevator go all the way to the top floor. For this they are prepared to conduct themselves with discipline and obey authority—as long as it brings success. This silent agreement has its clear and uncompromising rules and even though obviously they will never be spelled out openly they are well known to all participants.

Furthermore, ODS attracts people acquiring property by restitution and privatization. This party must do everything in its power to strengthen a "new class" so as to have a base to depend on. It will find "cognizant" support above all from born-again owners and new owners, people successful in the new mechanism of life as determined by the market. The ODS bylaws formulated it *sotto voce* by presenting a party of capable, enterprising and self-confident people able to shoulder responsibility for themselves, their families, their community and the state. Because a "pure" social base of the party is still only in the process of formation, direct questions must elicit not very direct answers. To the question of what strata of the population would support ODS Vaclav Klaus replied, "We are open to the public as a whole but it remains to be seen who will support us." He then added that evidently it will be people aware of the need to support economic reform and the emerging democracy.

But much more instructive than the wording of the bylaws or the replies at press conferences is the fact that the second

working day of the ODS constituent congress began with a working breakfast of top leaders with Mr. Tomas Bata.

The Hayek-Friedman Doctrine

If the mark of a charismatic personality is the ability to split any audience into supporters and opponents and reduce the number of the indifferent to a minimum, Vaclav Klaus is without doubt a charismatic personality. At the ODS constituent congress there were of course only his supporters in attendance. Deputy Macek even said that the party chairman is not selected but simply exists, and that it will be a bad day for the party when it has to look for a chairman. "He simply is and we all know it." Dr. Sladek later commented maliciously that his SPR-RSC [Association for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party] has 25 thousand times more members than ODS because the latter's only member is Vaclav Klaus. The chairman and minister is not too shy to take advantage of his own party's predisposition to submit to strong authority. He is not only chairman but also the chief ideologue promoting most resolutely The Only Correct Doctrine, with just a little malice we could call it Hayekism-Friedmanism.

In his numerous articles Vaclav Klaus never ceases to point out the merits of modern conservative thinkers, especially Friedrich von Hayek who has shown that all sorts of socialist and collectivist thought are nothing but attempts to achieve the impossible, and Milton Friedman with his central thesis that the state should not interfere with the economy. Friedman and people of his school are in the background of The Only Possible Road To A Market Economy as it is being pushed by the present finance minister. Milton Friedman recently explained why former socialist countries must conduct such a "capitalist" policy as is not being practiced even in countries of classical capitalism: "We in the United States can afford a middle way because we have behind us over a hundred years of a free market and have become sufficiently wealthy to even afford waste. The United States is 50 percent socialist. Countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia are however not wealthy enough to afford it." His most important advice is: privatize, privatize, privatize. Vaclav Klaus heeds this advice but also many others so that in March OBČANSKÝ DENÍK could publish his article "A Trip With Friedman" from which we learned that according to the living classic "we are going in the right direction and at the right speed."

The ODS chairman holds his party—and would it were only the party—in thrall to the theoretical constructions of an economist who regards the United States as 50 percent socialist. Even within the sphere of the world's right-wing movements this view is rightist in the extreme and so is our own, Klaus's, right wing. One can understand that he rejects alternative proposals of Messrs. Komarek, Matejka, and company as utopian and socialist-oriented, this is still within the normal range.

A little more peculiar is the fact that he rejects even the very term social market economy. Mr. Klaus contends

that the word social is not a neutral term but rather a camouflage disguising a completely different idea of the future social order. Seemingly just one word, yet in reality, expression of the difference between those who want real change and those who do not. But in this case the ODS chairman rejects not only collectivist systems among which he includes both communism and fascism, he rejects not only socializing concepts but also the Swedish and German models of society with their constitutionally anchored term of a "social state"; he dismisses not only the ruling Austrian socialists and the French socialists, but also the entire Italian Left, even the Christian Democracy. From Vaclav Klaus's perspective even John Paul II is a dangerous leftist, having written in the "Centesimus Annus" encyclical about a chance to build the postcommunist part of the world so that it would escape "the sins of capitalism."

A doctrinaire radicalism can be perceived also in such statements by the chairman and minister as the assertion that the new does not emerge from adding to the old and from a resulting parallel existence of both, but solely from liquidating the old, in support he cites the famous term "creative destruction" coined by the economist Schumpeter. There are immense possibilities in applying this term. Let us quote: "The unsaleability of our products is a reality which the state cannot change. It is our enterprises, our entrepreneurs, whether privatized or not, who must address this problem and there are only two possible outcomes. Either they manage to adapt quickly (find new products or radically reduce costs), or they cannot manage and therefore must cease their longtime production activity. There is no other solution." The minister has already made it clear that the government's job is to press for macroeconomic changes, and this for him is the end of economic policy. But in reality it is precisely where the policy ought to begin, because just as it is impossible to throw a nonswimmer into the sea in the hope that he will quickly learn how to swim, a national economy cannot be thrown at "the market" and see whether it will manage. But according to the Hayekism-Friedmanism doctrine the state's help is inadmissible. A backward South Korea was lucky not to have learned this modern science, or as ex-Prime Minister Shin Hyon-Hwaka said, in their economic miracle the state played "a leading role above all in pointing out which branches have a promising future, and those received government support. Sometimes in the form of direct subsidy for research, sometimes by low-interest loans, sometimes by tax breaks." One has only to hope that respecting all the principles of Hayekism-Friedmanism will be as effective as ignoring them.

The Curse of Sticking to Principle

The other right-wing party—the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)—began to form already in semi-illegal seminars in the mid-1980s, according to Daniel Kroupa, its founder and deputy chairman. The seminars were attended not only by intellectuals from abroad but reportedly also by World Bank experts already then interested in seeing how the notion of a future economic reform was shaping up. Let us add that it is equally possible to be interested in a notion shaping up as it is to

shape the notion. The fact is that ODA just like ODS firmly adheres to the so-called classical liberalism. It has yielded to Klaus leadership in matters of economics and the economy, while engaging itself prominently in the area of statehood arrangements. The solutions it proposes have their solid theoretical foundations. Pavel Bratinka, the ODA chairman, is of the opinion that today in our country as well as in the world there are two rival concepts of a nation. "The first is Western, in which the word nation denotes a community creating a state with no regard for the multitude of ethnic groups forming this community."

He cites examples—the Belgian nation consisting of Flemings and Walloons, the Swiss nation of a people speaking four different languages. Another concept pushed by ODA is that the Czechoslovak state should be based on the civic, rather than national principle. The basic goal is creation of a unitary state but because this can not be accomplished at present, it is necessary to attain such form of a federative arrangement that would be functional. In any case the principle should be that federal legislation is superior to republican laws—asserts Daniel Kroupa. He has already made a number of comments on the question of what would happen after the breakup of the common state. The Czech koruna's exchange rate vis-a-vis the mark would allegedly remain the same, but the Slovak koruna's rate would be somewhere near 40 to 1. ODA contends that Slovakia is not capable in the near term of integrating with the European market system and should be aware of it.

The third right-wing parliamentary Czech party—Christian Democratic [KDS]—according to its chairman Vaclav Benda also backs Klaus's and the government's scenario of economic transformation and views it as sinister if anyone now proposes other alternatives not compatible with it. The chairman also says that under the pressure of leftist forces the government is deviating substantially from its own scenario, but that KDS does not want to topple the government, only force it to stick to what it had put forward. Mr. Benda is also upset that imports were subjected to a 20-percent surcharge—he sees it as an attack on the very heart of the reform and finds it totally incomprehensible that the reform's architects could assent to it. It seems that the right wing's curse is its sticking to the principle, as Mr. Benda insists on the principle of import liberalization and a rapid opening up of the economy to the world even after everyone has seen what happened to the economy of the former GDR after these steps were taken.

Mr. Tsl, the party's deputy chairman, together with two other colleagues attempted to guide developments in agriculture at a time of its decollectivization. The calculation was to see three and one-half million land owners, who according to the original version of the three T's legislation were to get in addition to land ownership also a commensurate portion of cooperative assets. Were this to pass, a pie worth 230 billion korunas [Kcs] would be up for distribution. And because it was a pie created both by the work of cooperative members and by taxes levied

on all citizens, the owners so bestowed would be extremely grateful precisely to those who arranged it for them. Otherwise, the KDS differs from the first two right-wing parties by its emphasis on Christian values.

So it seems that the Czech right wing is doing all it can to keep the characteristic national custom—moving from one side of the road to the other. It is exerting itself vigorously to replace a nonsensical and all-embracing collectivism immediately with a no-holds-barred, ruthless individualism, to have the stupid planning mania abolished forthwith by unlimited faith in the market's invisible hand which will solve all things, to move from veneration of an all-powerful state to condemnation of everything it is involved with. The pendulum has swung from one extreme position to another. But since one extreme has failed, are we to be convinced that the true recipe is in the opposite extreme?

Biography of Gustav Husak Ready for Print

91CH06554 Bratislava NOVE SLOVO, p. 8, 1991
13 Jun 91 pp 6.

[Interview with biographer Václav Plevza by Jaroslav Lajda; place and date not given. "The Rises and Falls of Gustav Husak"]

[Text] [Lajda] I know that you have finished a book on the extraordinarily dramatic life story of Gustav Husak. Tatrapress is readying its publication under the title "The Rises and Falls of Gustav Husak." This then is the culmination of your effort spanning over 20 years to publish a biography of this personality. Why did it take so long?

[Plevza] It was unavoidable that the book should answer many questions which until the end of 1989 simply were not and could not be officially discussed or written about. I was at work on some aspects of Gustav Husak's life as early as in the first half of the 1960's—his activity in the student movement and the Resistance, especially in books on the Day circle and V. Clementis. From the early 1970's on, I undertook a more concentrated study of this subject matter. The source base I had available included also my notes on conversations with Gustav Husak from 1968 onward but especially since April of last year, archival materials and other historical sources. I have spoken to dozens of people who worked with Husak.

[Lajda] So the main purpose of the book is

[Plevza] ...to give a truthful account of Gustav Husak's activity dating back to his entry into politics but especially since 1944 when he became one of the leaders of the Slovak National Uprising. This account includes factual information until now taboo or known only to a narrow circle of persons, as well as setting straight some oversimplified or faulty conclusions of our historiography including some I myself was not able to avoid in the past.

[Lajda] What does it mean, a truthful account or historical truth?

[Plevza] I have in mind a multisource, creative search for historical truth which ought to be one of the attributes of a democratic environment. In order to prevent replacement of one totalitarian way of thinking by another, one needs to respect—hand in hand with freedom of thought—multitudinous approaches to evaluating historical processes and their actors, and thus also diverse evaluations based on ideological positions. The vantage point of this or that author. Not all scientists and publicists follow this principle.

[Lajda] Could you give a brief description of the book's content?

[Plevza] The work deals with Gustav Husak's activities in the student and youth movement of the pre-Munich Republic, in the antifascist resistance and the Uprising, evaluates his positions prior to February 1948 and after, deals with the causes and circumstances of his arrest, life sentence and his human lot after the "fraudulent" rehabilitation of 1963. The central part of the story is in chapters covering developments after January 1968, 21 August and the consequences of the intervention, as well as Gustav Husak's activities following 17 April 1969 in the post of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and since May 1975 in the highest state office. The book's final part sketches Husak's life after the end of his political career—after returning to private life in Bratislava.

[Lajda] From time to time we hear stories that Gustav Husak refuses to testify before commissions appointed by the Federal and Slovak Governments to review our history since 1968. He does not receive domestic or foreign journalists. This fact that you as an historian who has known him for three decades were able to hold work sessions with him since spring of last year would suggest that Gustav Husak did talk and decided to talk also in public. It is, by the way, aside the conversation published in No. 391 of NOVE SLOVO.

[Plevza] Gustav Husak responded to written questions I had given him in advance and to those which arose during our meetings which were truly work sessions. I subordinated all our contacts in this regard to my work on the biography and am extremely glad that on his part he offered extraordinarily valuable assistance. The recent story that "Gustav Husak talks" and that a book with this title is about to be published is untrue. Such a title could appear only on the cover of his own memoirs but he is now only getting ready to write them. I believe that Gustav Husak does not basically refuse to reply to questions, he gets in proposals for interviews, for the most part he regards them as decent. But for the time being he does not want to engage in more broadly structured conversations because it is evidently impossible to bring ones' soul on a few pages. But he is meanwhile opposed to these short-breath, sensationalist conversations which the press has carried with some former politicians. He refuses to lend political "gore" to the press. He had repeatedly that when his health improves, when he will be more fit both psychologically and physically, he as

recovering from major stomach surgery). He will respond to questions put to him by scientific workers and publicists with meritable intentions.

Our many conversations centered around the major issues of political developments in Czechoslovakia during the last half-century. He suggested himself on 14 May of this year that we did not have enough meetings to cover the multitude of existing problems. My work was made more difficult by being able only to take notes during our conversations from which I subsequently restored the full account. Although, asked many times, he resolutely rejected the use of a tape recorder. Only once when he was formulating a response to my attacks by the former CSSR Interior Minister R. Barak did I succeed to overcome his aversion to the recording tap.

[Lajda] Alas, you too have turned down conversations about the life of G. Husak. That's certainly a pity because people have a right to information also about the former politicians.

[Plevza] I worked on the manuscript of the biography until May of this year and thus was unable to publish excerpts from the book which was attracting considerable interest both at home and abroad. Interest in interviewing me in this connection was shown only by a few newspapers, and you know well yourself that I have not turned down all the requests.

[Lajda] If my information is correct, Dr. Gustav Husak has expressed serious reservations on the final draft of your book.

[Plevza] Work on the manuscript progressed smoothly. In its first draft in early October 1989 I received comment from G. Husak and so also thanks to such experts as Prof. V. Mencl and Dr. Lubomir Liptak who reviewed the work at this stage most thoroughly and fairly. Generally, I concentrated fully on completing the book. Since the beginning of this year our work coincided with Gustav Husak continued which helped me a great deal in finishing the manuscript. Dr. Husak too expressed his satisfaction. But toward the end of May he advised me that after reading the entire manuscript he disagrees with my concept and many partial evaluations, that he personally opposes its publication because as he is convinced, in the book I identify with criticism of the past regime and play up to anti-communist "sensation mongers."

[Lajda] What do you think has caused this turnaround?

[Plevza] I was taken aback by this change in Gustav Husak's position. The reason is evidently as I have just described it.

[Lajda] Can you be more specific?

[Plevza] Look already in the book's preface I wrote that history never was and is not just black and white even if these colors transpose places after the regimes change. History may not be simplified, glorified or condemned; it has to be explained truthfully even if this involves sensitive aspects of the life of prominent personalities. It

does not tolerate emotions, passions or moralizing. In concordance with this I have sought an insight into the course of Gustav Husak's life, the journeys of his political and partly also private life.

[Lajda] What is the essence of his political and statesman's journeys?

[Plevza] First of all that he was always deeply convinced that the Czechs and Slovaks freely chose the socialist road and that despite all obstacles and difficulties they did everything to consummate it. In this he also saw his life's purpose. He did not and does not want to concede that what he himself saw as deformations of socialism and to which he himself fell victim in the 1950's and also 1960's, are the ills of an unreformable system, model manifestations of a permanently gravely sick and crisis-rife social organism, symptoms of its approaching collapse. Even in the final periods of his political and statesman's activity, as I show in the book, he was convinced that mankind can overcome the power rivalries and other antagonisms of an ideologically divided world into two blocs only in a struggle between the two opposing systems and by a victory of socialism. Thus he bears political responsibility for the failure also of our own leadership structures to grasp the historical necessity to move forward to carry out fundamental social changes required by the new epoch. By this I mean creating conditions for eliminating the ills of an authoritarian regime and for a free development of the individual as the decisive constituent of a democratic society, for replacing an administrative-command, bureaucratic system based on one party's power monopoly with a political system based on plurality and a law-governed state, for eliminating state monopoly from the national economy by transitioning to a social market economy, for a comprehensive Czech-Slovak compromise for social and spiritual-cultural progress not under the control of a state party.

I was and remain convinced that an insight into Gustav Husak's life from the perspective I have indicated will offer the perceptive reader a closer understanding also of the travails of the Czech and Slovak nation and nationalities living in a common state, however small its area, in the heart of Europe but deeply rooted in the soil and history of this continent by their uncommon cultural-historical development, noble deeds as well as defeats, struggles as well as resignations, victories as well as cruel defeats, humiliating falls as well as proud ascents, an undaunted striving for a better life, justice and freedom of political choice, faith in their democratic future.

[Lajda] Let's return to the problem of the book's publication.

[Plevza] It is my belief that Gustav Husak will return to his original standpoint, or at least to the view he expressed in our telephone conversation when he answered my question whether he regards my text as lacking in objectivity. He said: "No, it is the topic itself that excites me."

[Lajda] Professor Ivan Svitek wrote recently that every power elite sees truth as a provocation. Is it that Dr. Husak is not at all interested in someone writing about him precisely for this reason?

[Pleva] I firmly believe that this is not the case. In the situation that has arisen I had however to tell the Tatrapress director that I can not and will not betray my scientific and civic stand. It is also because in the past I wrote books which simplified political developments in our country after 1968 that I feel a moral duty to present my view and to keep clear, cost what it may, of any muzzling of historical truth about our recent and most recent history—even though in connection with my determination to publish this biography Gustav Husak thinks differently. My right to take this step is evident and I do not intend to surrender it. I don't want to remain a silent or silenced historian.

Census Shows Slovaks One-Third of Population

[EPA/06/02/39]

[Editorial Report] Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 29 June on page 1, under the headline "What Are We Like in the Language of Numbers" carries an 800-word report by Jana Bendova on the first results of the latest census. It gives the following list of nationalities represented in the entire CSFR:

Nationality	Total	Percent
Czechs	8,428,070	54.1
Slovak	4,819,948	31
Moravians	360,088	2.7
Silesians	48,713	.3
Hungarian	586,884	3.8
Romany	114,116	.7
Polish	67,842	0.4

German	53,418	0.3
Ruthenian	18,648	0.1
Ukrainian	20,654	0.1
Russian	8,930	0.05
Other	24,300	0.3
Not established	30,772	0.2

The report concludes with a comment on the relativity of the statistical data and an example: "In the census, 114,116 citizens claimed the Romany nationality, while the data from the news conference of the Romany National Congress report more than 720,000 of Czechoslovak citizens to be of Romany nationality."

While the above report does not cite population figures for the two republics of the federation, Bratislava CTK in English at 1641 GMT on 28 June, in a similar report adds:

"Slovakia has a population of 5,268,935, an increase of 277,767 over the past decade, living in 2,834 cities and villages, according to preliminary results of the March 1991 census.

"The results of the census were announced by chairman of the Slovak statistical office Rudolf Krc at a meeting of the Presidium of the Slovak parliament.

"A total of 4,511,679 are Slovaks, 53,422 Czechs, 388 Moravians, 1,198 Silesians, 566,741 Hungarians, 80,627 Romanies (Gypsies), 2,969 Poles, 5,629 Germans, 16,937 Ruthenes and 13,847 Ukrainians."

Senate Constitutional Draft Explained, Criticized

Commission Chairman on Draft

91EP0557A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
31 May 91 p 3

[Interview with Alicja Grzeskowiak, chairman of the Senate's Constitutional Commission, by Zaneta Semprich; place and date not given: "We Want To Initiate a Nationwide Debate"]

[Text] [Semprich] What has prompted the Senate's Constitutional Commission to develop its own draft of the new constitution, even though the Sejm's Constitutional Commission undertook the same thing?

[Grzeskowiak] The commission decided to develop its own draft because its members felt that the draft of a new constitution should be based on a homogeneous system of values, and that the composition of the Sejm's Constitutional Commission was such as to doubt whether it could develop such a draft. The reason is that the members of the Sejm commission were selected in accordance with the political composition of the Sejm as ensuing from the roundtable agreement, and although after some time that agreement ceased to exist, the composition of the Sejm commission remained unchanged. Moreover, the members of the Senate commission felt that the Senate, as the chamber of representatives elected in fully free and democratic elections, has a special mandate for drafting and presenting a new constitution of the free republic.

[Semprich] What are the principal features of the constitution drafted by the Senate's Constitutional Commission, and how do they differ in general from the currently binding Constitution?

[Grzeskowiak] In our draft we assumed that the man is the paramount value and the state is the common good of all citizens. This assumption predetermined the nature of the constitutional approach, and chiefly the approach to rights, freedoms, and civil obligations. Our position is that man has certain inherent rights; hence, the state is not their bestower, and they are not a privilege conferred by the authorities. These rights belong to man, and the purpose of the state is to acknowledge and protect them! Any constraints on these rights may only concern the manner in which they are utilized, and that only and solely insofar as this affects the rights of other people or, in closely defined cases, the good of the community.

We have adopted a different structure of the state than that prescribed in the present Constitution. Thus, we presuppose separation of powers and their balances in the context of the adopted principle of supremacy of the nation (construed as the community of all citizens). We thus reject the principle that one kind of power is superior to another. Accordingly, the Sejm is the supreme executive power. In this connection, we are altering or differently determining the competences of

one branch of power in relation to another. For example, the president has the sole right to appoint the prime minister and the government, but the chamber of deputies [Sejm] may pass a vote of no-confidence in the government, which means dismissal of the government; should the chamber of deputies cause the government to be thus dismissed three times, the president has the right to dissolve the Sejm.

Among other matters let me mention that our draft of the constitution includes a chapter on the sources of law, which is something new for a Polish constitution. In this way we want to translate into reality the long-expressed postulate of ordering lawmaking and subjecting it to certain principles. We also are proposing a number of novel solutions, e.g., the introduction, in emulation of the French Constitution, of the so-called organic laws, the definition of matters that can be regulated only by laws, and the specific place of international law in the system of the sources of domestic law.

[Semprich] The passage of organic laws requires an absolute majority of votes. Does this not involve the risk of slowing down the pace of democratic changes in this country?

[Grzeskowiak] Democratic changes are safeguarded by the Constitution, while organic laws are to translate these changes into reality and assure their relative stability. In our draft of the constitution we defined closely the matters which should be regulated by organic law. Generally speaking, these matters concern the supreme and central authorities in the state. The specific procedure for the adoption of organic law is intended to protect democratic mechanisms against arbitrary and unorthodox changes.

[Semprich] Fairly often in the past, lofty constitutions abounding in sonorous declarations and rights used to be written, but not much came of them in practice. How is the problem of respecting civil rights and liberties treated in the draft of the Senate commission?

[Grzeskowiak] The commission proceeded from the premise that a constitution should be juridical, not declarative, in nature, and that it should be directly applicable. Hence we included in the catalogue of civil rights and liberties only the rights—social, economic, and cultural rights—which can be translated into reality in the institutional system envisaged by the constitution. Hence also, e.g., our draft does not safeguard the right to work for everyone, and instead it merely provides for the state's care over that work. We did not want to make empty promises, because we treat man seriously. In our draft of the constitution we noted that anyone whose constitutionally safeguarded rights are violated is entitled to resort to means of legal, judicial redress.

[Semprich] Recently the question of defining the relationship between the state and the church in the Constitution has been widely debated. What proposals on this matter are contained in the draft of the constitution prepared by the Senate commission?

[Grzeskowiak] Our draft of the constitution bases the church-state relationship on the principle of the autonomy and independence of both partners, each of whom, that is, the state and the [Catholic] Church, rules itself by its own laws. We also adopted the principle of mutual respect and appropriate cooperation between the state and the church. We apply this principle not only to the Catholic Church but to other churches and religious denominations.

[Semprich] Our interview is taking place on the eve of the constitutional debate in the Senate.

[Grzeskowiak] We believe that the Senate debate should initiate a nationwide debate of the new constitution. However, as we have already repeatedly emphasized, the act itself of adopting the new constitution should belong to a parliament of fully, freely, and democratically elected representatives. We would like to present our draft of the constitution to precisely such a parliament, in the hope that it would avail itself of it.

Church-State Issue Contested

ref P055 B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
STALIN 2/1/91

[Statements by Senator Karol Modzelewski, member of Labor Solidarity, edited by J.F.; place and date not given. "The Citizen Refuses To Be Tolerated: Senator Karol Modzelewski on the Senate's Draft of the Constitution"]

[Text] Senator Karol Modzelewski made the following remarks:

A constitutional debate was held in the Senate. I believe that it should now be somewhat toned down. After all, we were discussing a draft that is not going to be voted on in the Sejm whether now or during its next term of office.

The anxiety caused by the language of some of the provisions in the draft of the Senate's Constitutional Commission, concerning the religious state, also should be assuaged.

It may be that the rise of the opposite poles of clericalism and anticlericalism during the Senate debate was inevitable. But it is to be deplored. Any attempt to involve the [Catholic] Church in partisan politics or to assign to it the role of a force having the decisive voice in affairs of state is harmful to the position gained by the Church during all the periods of national enslavement, periods when it served as the pillar of social resistance. After all, it has earned this position of an unquestioned moral authority. I am referring right now not to religious authority but precisely to a moral authority that is respected not only by the faithful but also by laymen and those professing other religions.

Present-day Poland is greatly in need of an authority to look up to. Placing the Church in a situation of seeming

activism, which is tantamount to undermining its authority, impoverishes us all. We all are losing something essential.

What are the chances for counteracting these tendencies? One way would be to emphasize in drafts of the constitution the principle of the state's neutrality vis-a-vis religious and world-outlook differences. We should guard against a bias in favor of the Catholic Church against placing it in a position other than those of the other churches in Poland.

Why am I placing such emphasis on such neutrality of the state? Because I believe that it is inseparable from the principle of equality of citizens. If in the draft of the Senate's Constitutional Commission the concept "We the Polish People" is interpreted as all the citizens of the Polish state, and in view of the values safeguarded in the Constitution, then some citizens should not be treated as second-class citizens because they are, e.g., unbelievers.

A citizen may be assured 100 times that the majority will be tolerant toward the minority, and the actual exercise of toleration may even be monitored. But even so a citizen may declare that he does not want to be "tolerated" in his own country, that it is his country, too, like that of any other citizen, and that the Constitution is to safeguard his equal treatment rather than toleration.

I like the formulation "We the People." It is patterned on the American Constitution. Thus my comments rather concern the religious connotations contained in the controversial preamble to the draft of the constitution. Its authors address us "In the name of the Almighty." This may be acceptable to representatives of various monotheistic religions but not to laymen, not to unbelievers.

We should be on guard against the introduction of criteria of division according to attitude toward religious and denominational symbols, as these would rationalize the exploitation of religious symbolism for partisan political purposes.

Nowadays the game of politics may be played by betting on clericalism, but it also may be played by betting on anticlericalism, which is certainly no less popular among the public. It seems to me that relying on such criteria impoverishes and degrades the value of religious symbolism—and makes political life less transparent.

I believe that other political issues exist which are much closer to the everyday life of the citizen and deserve to be openly debated.

Legal Points Critiqued

ref P055 C Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
STALIN 2/1/91

[Article by Janusz Ekes. "A Question About the Spirit: The Senate Draft of the Constitution"]

[Text] The lofty concept of the spirit of the constitution has taken root in European thought. It implies the certainty that constitutional institutions are guided from above by a force that does not resort to material instruments for accomplishing its will. That force is the force of the principles to which the institutions are subordinated in order to promote self-realization of the individual and the community. The nature of these principles hinges on the acknowledged and causal hierarchy of values. The spirit of the constitution depends on the principles, and these in turn stem from the values. The spirit of the constitution is reflected in its letter, that is, in the notation of the rights safeguarding its power. To ask about the value of any constitution is to ask about its spirit.

I

In the recently published Senate draft of the Constitution of the Third Polish Republic, the order in which problems are listed is as follows: [Chapters] I. Paramount Principles; II. Civil Rights, Liberties, and Obligations; III. Sources of Law; IV. Legislative Power; V. Executive Power; VI. Judicial Power; VII. Local Self-Rule; VIII. National Defense and States of Emergency in the State; IX. Control Institutions; and X. Amending the Constitution.

Already the first chapter elicits reservations. It orders certain fragments of the public reality selected in the absence of a clear criterion. The striking thing about this supposedly fundamental chapter of the constitution is the absence of any references to such principles as the primacy of natural law over statutory law; respect for the law of nations by the state; the obligation to protect the heritage of nature; the obligation to protect the cultural heritage; the obligation of national defense; freedom of information; equality of citizens; and inviolability of the conscience, dignity, body, and property of the citizen.

It is not fitting for a chapter dealing with sources of law to follow, as in the draft, rather than precede the exposition of the laws themselves. This negates the "regal dimension" of the law, a dimension understood as early as in the dawn of the European civilization, in the Roman Republic, acknowledged in the constitutional system of the First Polish Republic, and acknowledged to this day in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, the dignity of law is formally violated because the draft assigns to judicial power the last rather than the first place among the three branches of power (Article 4 and Chapters IV-VI). This besides duplicates the pattern of the March [17 March 1921] Constitution, a pattern which in this respect is discordant with tradition. This concerns not some cosmetic issue but an expression of the constitutional spirit. A cardinal and substantive flaw of the chapter is the absence of primacy of natural law over statutory law. And when such a principle is absent among the cardinal principles mentioned, this is tantamount to its nonrecognition.

The order in which issues are considered in the draft is also linked to at least two other shortcomings. The arrangement does not clearly present the principles themselves and their legal safeguards. This affects adversely the practicality and usefulness of the document. The other shortcoming consists of the absence of a separate chapter that would, in discussing the attributes of the state under a title that would at least be analogous to the title of the chapter enumerating civil rights, confirm that the state is a carrier of rights. In the only [chapter] title in which the word "the state" is included, "National Defense and States of Emergency in the State," the state is clearly treated as an object rather than as a subject. This also is demonstrated by the formulation "The Polish Republic as the common good" (Article 2) and the fact that the title of internal sovereignty ascribed to the nation, is not linked to the state (Article 3).

The treatment of the state as an object and not a subject is philosophically debatable and does not seem to be juridically useful. The state is repeatedly mentioned in the draft: in the character of a party, e.g., in the discussion of relations with the church (Article 8); in the character of the mandator of justice (Article 196, Paragraph 6); but most often as the guarantor of civil liberties and addressee of civic obligations (Chapter II). The absurdity of the state's positions in all these cases is evident since as an object it can be neither a party to a relationship nor a mandator of justice; it cannot guarantee anything to anyone or require anything. The failure to treat the state as a subject, not an object, in the constitution, while treating the three branches of power as subjects, not objects, results in a glaring contrast in that it endows the authorities with arbitrary powers vis-a-vis the rights and duties inscribed in the constitution on behalf of the state—powers that admittedly are favored by a certain type of officialdom.

II

The rights, liberties, and obligations of the citizen presented in the draft seem to diverge in many major respects from justified ideas and aspirations. This concerns already the acknowledgment of and safeguards for the protection of "innate and inviolable rights of man and his basic liberties" by the state (Article 10), in the sense that said acknowledgment and safeguards are actually negated by the remainder of that sentence, which contains the demand that the individual "perform the obligations of political, economic, and social solidarity."

What can such a demand signify?

The need for social solidarity and the validity of the tenet contained in Article 12—namely, "In availing himself of his innate rights, man should bear in mind the common good and the rights and liberties of others"—are indisputable. But neither the state nor its authorities should be guarantors of the former and exponents of the latter because this need and that tenet are matters of individual conscience and social mores. The state is

unable to substitute these instruments. Thus, in positing a right to this need and that tenet, the relationship to the European spirit is forfeited. Besides, in this sense also the above provision conflicts with Article 24, Paragraph 1, which safeguards freedom of conscience.

Next, the requirement of political solidarity, however it may be interpreted, insults the principle of political pluralism viewed as a cardinal principle in the draft (Article 7), if the relationship between the citizen and the state is also linked to that requirement. If, on the other hand, the relationship between the citizen and a political party is linked to that requirement, that would be a threat to the safeguards of freedom of thought, belief, and views (Article 25), while at the same time providing a constitutional basis for totalitarian statutory formulations by which political parties could bind their members. Lastly, a grave interpretational danger is harbored in the requirement of economic solidarity. It is difficult to believe that it imposes the duty of almsgiving, since the latter, being a moral requirement of charity, may constitute an act of social solidarity. When viewed through the prism of employee-employer relationship, this conflicts with the safeguards of the right to strike (Article 40, Paragraph 1), and when viewed through the prism of employer-employee relationship, this conflicts with the right to freedom of economic activity (Article 38), while its effect on relations among employees is such as to make any eventual antitrust legislation inconsonant with the constitution.

Then, too, one is apprehensive that the principle of equality before law is not regarded as a cardinal one in view of its position in the constitution (Article 13, Paragraph 2), since this detracts from its importance by placing it below provisions concerning less important problems of interpretation (Article 11 and Point 2 of an article whose Point 1 should have served to define that principle alone).

Furthermore, contrary to the related ideas and aspirations, the draft does not provide for unequivocal constitutional safeguards of freedom of association. To be sure, Article 35, Paragraph 1 acknowledges that freedom and rightly provides solely for the legislative regulation of the procedure for judicial registration [of associations] without requiring prior [official] approval, but Article 37, Paragraph 3 provides for the possibility of curtailing freedom of association by legislative authority in consideration of "national security, public order, health, morality, or the rights and liberties of other persons."

Endowing legislative authority with the powers of Article 37, Paragraph 3 deprives freedom of association, as presented in the draft, of its constitutional safeguards.

Besides, Article 51, Paragraph 1, Point 1 also endows legislative authority with the power of regulating the "boundaries of freedoms and the scope of the rights and duties of citizens established in the Constitution, along with their safeguards." As a result, none of the civil

rights and liberties and civic obligations can be considered as being directly safeguarded, not even the dubious letter of the law in this draft.

III

Time flies and Poland lacks a political vision, as demonstrated by the above-mentioned draft of the constitution and the rather common attitude toward it. Yet it will be largely owing to a proper constitution that the society will be able to "thank God and not turn the lights off" en route to better times ahead. Only if Poles of both sexes rally round institutions tailored to meet the demands of the era in the name of supreme and properly safeguarded principles will the nation be able to speed up its journey on that road.

A new constitution is needed in Poland, just as Poland is needed in the New Europe. Let it therefore be a constitution and a political vision fitting both the New Europe and the Old Polish Commonwealth, in which "Consent by All" was the principle and the commonwealth the goal.

Michnik on Political Scene, Preelection Alliances

91EP05394 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 22
1 Jun 91 p 3

[Interview with Adam Michnik, editor in chief of GAZETA WYBORCZA, by Janina Paradowska; place and date not given: "Playing Three Cards"]

[Text] [Paradowska] "Adam is finished. He has fallen victim to the battle he waged." That, more or less, is what Jadwiga Staniszkis said about you. And she is not alone in her opinion. If we view the matter more broadly, there is more and more talk about ending the political role of that intellectual formation called the formation of dialogue or meeting, which led to the evolutionary changes in Poland and Central Europe. Do you also believe that it is time to leave the scene?"

[Michnik] The mental cogitation of Prof. Staniszkis is usually very loosely connected to reality. I remember the idea that the changes in the former communist Europe are the result of a KGB conspiracy. Actually, the statement referring to me appears to be true. I, too, believe that the times of the presence in politics of people like me are drawing to a close.

[Paradowska] How would you characterize these people?"

[Michnik] They are the people who entered politics as a result of a certain ethical and aesthetic impulse, people who refused to consent to normal operation under a communist dictatorship. It was a fully conscious withdrawal to the fringes of public life, a self-condemnation to nonexistence. It did not occur to anyone in 1965, 1966, or 1968 that everything would come apart with such a crash and in such a spectacular way, that virtue

would be rewarded, and that we would turn from dissidents into luminaries. The decision of condemning oneself to remain on the fringes produced something that I would consider as specific to thinking about politics. It was based on the fact that the principle "do not do anything nasty" was more important than tactics. This specific quality emanated from the painful experience of our older generation, who wanted to take part in politics at the cost of compromise with the truth, with their conscience. In principle they were right, for that is normally the price one pays to take part in politics. But we told ourselves that in the communist system we will not pay this price, for that is the road to hell. Now communism has passed and we remain with these impulses, with this, our ethical pathology.

[Paradowska] Politics is becoming normalized. Compromise is no longer the "road to hell" you call it but is becoming a more and more desirable value. You yourself speak of the need for it. Then why does this "ethical pathology" represent such an obstacle?

[Michnik] I should not like to lodge a complaint against reality in this very context. Perhaps it is completely normal that various people are good for various times and that not everyone is suited to everything. You are correct—politics is becoming normalized, and those people for whom it was not just a game, but was primarily concern over values, are being pushed aside. In any event, things will be more difficult for them. That could have been anticipated, and thus there is no cause for despair. But enough for my particular case.

[Paradowska] Then let us take a look at that special case from the somewhat broader perspective of the events that took place in Poland.

[Michnik] In moving out of the communist system into democratic order Poland had three big aces. The first was the philosophy of the roundtable, i.e., the conviction that various forces, including the reform-oriented forces of the former regime, were becoming integrated around the transformation program. Despite the quarrels and conflicts over this program, it was possible to believe that somehow a pact for democracy and restructuring the economy would be successfully built.

The second ace was Solidarity, a great movement which brought together people from different generations and communities, people with different biographies. Within its framework everyone was joined together by a definite idea of democratic order and the conviction that solidarity is more important than private interests. And there was a third opportunity—the tremendous authority of the Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II, which transcended politics and had been for more than a decade the most important moral authority for all Poles, regardless of religious conviction.

But somehow these three aces were wasted. The roundtable philosophy fell under the pressure of slogans for acceleration and decommunization. There was no determinism on this issue, it was not inevitable, specific

people decided this. The idea of solidarity did not survive the "war at the top," and the events of the last six months have caused the church to lose its position as arbiter of, witness to, and guardian of moral values. The church has become a side, frequently against its will, in the conflict over the political shape of the Polish state. And so this great authority that formerly banded people together is becoming an authority only for a part of society. I do not know how large a part, but the discussion over penal repression for abortion shows that a large portion of society does not share the position of the episcopate.

And there is another thing: a language has crept into the statements of church officials that was not there in the past. If it is possible to compare someone who favors a referendum on the subject of whether penal repression for abortion is appropriate to the creators and defenders of the concentration camps, if it is possible to call the supporters of such an option "barking street mongrels" and to compare the dismissed deputy minister of health, the author of a statement which was inadmissible and offensive to a certain category of citizens, to the imprisoned Primate Wyszyński, to Prime Minister Bielecki, and to Bierut, then I am really am not completely sure where it is that I am living.

[Paradowska] You say that nothing was inevitable. At the same time you say that it was possible to anticipate that the situation would develop in this way, that various political interests would come to the forefront, that maintaining unity artificially would not work. To me this represents a contradiction, a lack of skill in formulating proper diagnoses, but also a lack of foresight.

[Michnik] Given the facts, you are correct. It is very easy to accuse me of naivete today, but I do not regret that naivete. It is only by preserving a certain amount of naivete that I am able to believe in human integrity, in the ability of people to be disinterested and to be motivated by the common good. In Poland this did not succeed, but it did succeed in Spain. In Spain there was the same process of shifting from a repressive system, from a dictatorship, to a democracy under difficult social and economic conditions.

[Paradowska] You love these comparisons with Spain and Chile, but they are appropriate only to a certain point.

[Michnik] ...like all comparisons.

[Paradowska] In Poland political life was more severely destroyed, while in Spain and Chile there was a market and the middle class was not so badly destroyed.

[Michnik] That is true, but at a certain very difficult point both in Chile and in Spain a pact was made. In Spain it was even called the pact of Moncloa. For a certain period people stopped trying to implement their own interests and everyone aimed toward political democracy and the reform of the state. I believed that the

Solidarity camp within its major nucleus—and its leaders—would manage to define the interest of Poland correctly. I admit that I was mistaken in this.

[Paradowska] You make fun of conspiratorial theories of history, but your words contain echoes of conspiracy. Everything was possible until several people appeared who had unfettered ambitions and destroyed the great opportunities.

[Michnik] That was not several people. They were fundamental political forces: a strong parliamentary group, the current president, and the union led by him were involved in everything. That was not a conspiracy because the people were frustrated and the empty slogans about "a shortcut" fell on fertile soil. However, how this frustration will be articulated is always an open question. I maintain that, without the attack on the government of Mazowiecki under the slogan of taking a shortcut and putting an end to the crossing out with a bold stroke, that sort of venting of emotions and frustrations would not have occurred.

[Paradowska] In observing what was happening I always had the impression that you said that the other side had ill intentions (and they said that about you) regardless of what it was that was said and done and who did it. I find no brutal attack on the government in the declaration of the Center Accord [PC]. The slogan "Walesa for President" did not have to be a threat to Mazowiecki; the need for stepping up parliamentary elections became more and more obvious, deviating from the roundtable contract following the dissolution of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] does not appear to have been seditious either.

[Michnik] Madam, if you analyze the slogans calling for deviating from the roundtable contract, you will see what such deviation meant to parliament. In parliament there was also a contract establishing that the government should have a majority and be able to function. I do not wish to idealize the Mazowiecki government, but that is the melody from which the song is made. What else can we say but that things must be rectified, and what else can we cry out but that we must hurry to cross it out with a bold stroke because it protects criminals, thieves, and murderers. Moreover, my dear lady, everything that has been done or has been left undone in the last six months shows that that was empty prattle.

[Paradowska] We have the slogan of decommunization.

[Michnik] Meanwhile, neither Mr. President nor the chief of his office has decommunized anything. We shall see what happens next. Recently, at my deputies' meeting, an activist from the PC demanded decommunization. I asked him what he meant—perhaps you could tell me what he meant. I asked whether he was proposing that I go from house to house and confiscate the colored televisions and the carpeting of PZPR activists. Are we legally ushering in apartheid and determining which positions held in the PZPR prohibit one from holding current governmental positions? What does all this mean in practical terms? Propose something! The issue is not

the slogan itself but the fact that all this rhetoric, all this demagoguery, awakened in people a sense that things will improve rapidly in Poland if we drop the idea of crossing things out with a bold stroke and if it will be possible to give someone a thrashing.

[Paradowska] Rhetoric and demagoguery do not have such a destructive power if they do not fall upon receptive soil. Meanwhile, people had the idea all along (since 1 May) that nothing around them would change and that the disorder would get worse. The deterioration of moods since the spring of last year was a fact; the railroad workers' strike was a serious warning sign...among others.

[Michnik] I do not maintain that in Poland everyone was pleased with everything and that all of a sudden the Kaczynski brothers, who haunted Lech Walesa, changed everything for the worse. On the contrary, I maintain that the situation was extremely complex. With this sort of transformation of the system, in which stereotypes, behavioral models, and models of resourcefulness are destroyed, and people feel lost, it is very easy to deceive them. And the people were deceived. This destruction of a stable order in Poland is primarily the fault of people from the PC, although they were not the most aggressive ones. People of the ZChN [Christian-National Union] were more aggressive, but the ZChN would have been marginal if this style of thinking about and reacting to the crisis had not received the support of a large group of deputies and senators associated with the PC.

[Paradowska] You are very drawn to this vision of a stable order, to what is called "a consensus surrounding economic reform," but then we had the presidential elections and Tyminski. But there was no consensus.

[Michnik] Tyminski is the bastard child of the campaign conducted by the PC.

[Paradowska] I think you have gone too far.

[Michnik] Tyminski made use of their rhetoric of attacking the government. They were the first ones to say that there is a shortcut and Tyminski intervened and said that there is still a shorter shortcut, thus carrying the slogan of acceleration to the point of absurdity.

[Paradowska] But Tyminski also represents a growing group of the disenchanted who said "neither Solidarity nor the communists."

[Michnik] But I will stand by the idea that those who voted for Tyminski were voting for a miracle. To be able to believe in a miracle one first has to believe that there is a shortcut. That was in the past, for today the slogans used by Tyminski are characteristic of an earlier phase of fascist movements. And that is the direction toward which that disenchantment of society will tend. Formerly this either did not exist or it was marginal.

Here is my experience: For many years I was a member of the fringe, and all my political arguments in KOR [Workers Defense Committee], in the Solidarity of 1980-81, and in the underground were founded upon my belief

that we were right even though we were not in the majority at those times. Thus I believed that when the elections came people would support the project that we proposed even though we were still on the fringes. Once again, that is not faith in a conspiracy but a certain knowledge about the dynamics of social and political processes during a period of sudden change. Thus it may be said that if the Democratic Union [UD] today made use of the same sort of rhetoric in relation to the current government as the PC did in relation to Mazowiecki's government (and even to Bielecki's government), then it could draw a certain type of person and channel certain emotions. The union does not do this, adopting even the hypothesis of the defeat of its own private interests, believing that a higher interest exists for it, i.e., the good of the state. The relationship of the UD to the Bielecki government is ambivalent: it does not approve of many measures, but it does not permit itself to wage a frontal attack that would use the sort of language used now and in the past by the PC. The Democratic Union Parliamentary Club, of which I am a member, acts in a similar fashion.

[Paradowska] A frontal attack on Balcerowicz by the UD and directed by Mazowiecki would also be a phenomenon bordering on the absurd. However, since we are already speaking of the UD, let us return to the special case called Michnik. You did not join the UD, as a journalist you do not speak out on domestic affairs, and sometimes it is possible to hear you only in the Sejm. Today you give the impression of a man full of doubt, a man who does not envisage a good path.

[Michnik] I am not so much full of doubt as of disquiet. I received the news that there was a pilgrimage of voivodship governors to Jasna Gora. That is a fact that should be an alarm bell to everyone who takes the church seriously as a religious institution. I thought it was heinous that a voivodship governor could not be a practicing Catholic in the past but I am greatly disturbed when a voivodship governor as a high-level state official makes a pilgrimage to Jasna Gora in this role. Somewhere here the boundary between the sacred and the profane is transgressed. I am full of doubt when I read one commune after another about the activities of the president and those surrounding him, when I read very embarrassing reports about where Janek Pietrzak will have his cabaret, when I hear Minister Siwek, and I am very disconcerted when I find out that Mr. President was so impressed with Piotr Szczepanik that he appointed him secretary of state. On the other hand, I want to possess the maximum of good will and I admit that this good will is in a state of paralysis. The intellectual in me who should write the truth is always battling the man who is involved in politics who should know how to make compromises and be motivated by superior interest. That is why I still do not write what I should be writing.

[Paradowska] But you could be active in the UD.

[Michnik] That organization matches my thinking the closest, but I believe that as chief of a newspaper I should remain unaffiliated with a party.

[Paradowska] That may be merely a formal issue and it does not seem to me to be the most important one. Do you not believe in the future of the UD?

[Michnik] When that community was not divided, despite all sorts of doubts I believed that there was a place in it for me. But the split occurred. On the one side, there was the circle of people surrounding Zbyszek Bujak and on the other there were my colleagues who had decided to enter the UD. It is safer to observe this from a distance, especially since I am the head of a newspaper. And what about the future of the UD? This group is just beginning its existence and it will have to respond to many basic questions. That will not be an easy task. The people of the UD combined a certain attitude toward Mazowiecki government, to the government of compromise and unification. Now this no longer exists, and the divisions will be deeper and deeper. The source of these divisions will be the attitude of Leszek Balcerowicz to politics and the social consequences which result from this, the attitude to the relations between the state and the church. It was shocking to me that the UD did not elaborate a position on this issue.

[Paradowska] I would rather speak of the consequences emanating from the combining of such different currents than of being shocked.

[Michnik] That does not alter the fact that when the question about the shape of the state comes up, the citizen will want to know for whom he is voting. Is he voting for a state which approves of qualifying politicians of from "barking street hounds" over a state which does not approve of this? Is he in favor of sending women and physicians to prison over abortion or is he opposed to this? Does he favor a parliamentary republic or a presidential system of government? These issues cannot be ignored and the positions in the UD vary. This does not alter the fact that I believe the UD to be a relatively enlightened, democratic, and responsible force.

[Paradowska] Forces which have been so often criticized.

[Michnik] Sometimes it happens that parties blur together the repudiation of lies and empty promises and the impression that it is ineffectual, especially in long periods. I prefer to be on the side of supporting the state.

[Paradowska] You make such black and white judgments. We are good and noble and the age is good and decent. I do not believe in such political optimism. There is praise of inefficacy very convincing. Polish people, the art of reaching goals.

[Michnik] But by honoring the roles of the state, we are game, and not at any price.

[Paradowska] In speaking of the UD comes a question of "formation and coalition" and not "party." Michnik, today party-mindedness has become somewhat particular. Do you think that we have mapped out the Polish political scene mapped out?

[Michnik] I believe that all discussions on that subject may be merely of a general nature and that everything will change. I continue to believe that the division into left and right is artificial to a significant degree.

[Paradowska] Zbigniew Bujak recently changed his opinion and he maintains that there is something out of natural law in the fact that everything is pushing the political system in the direction of the creation of two poles—social democracy and Christian democracy.

[Michnik] He is playing with words, with wearing different suits. We apply some model and we pretend that we have what we want. Apply the prewar model to those who call themselves today the left. According to the prewar model, the left was in favor of socialism, a planned economy, and the socialization of the means of production. Now we are in favor of reprivatization and the market. It is as though the word "left" had turned into rubber. It is the same with the right. Is there in the programs of the Christian-democratic parties of Europe a narrower scope of social care by the state than Zbyszek Bujak proposes? It is a continual masquerade. Overnight the communists turned into social democrats, overnight the PC is becoming Christian democrat. Meanwhile, for years I listened to the statements of Jaroslaw Kaczynski and I never suspected that he was a Christian democrat. Perhaps in politics it is necessary to experience such miraculous transformations, but I prefer in this situation to remain Adam Michnik. If, within one formation, there is Frasnuk, Hall, Kuron, and Stryczek, and in the other there are the former members of PAX, Hniedziewicz, and Siwak and the Solidarity self-governments, then let us not speak nonsense about the left and the right. For me it is like playing a game of filling up slots.

[Paradowska] My dear sir, the game of filling 561 seats in the future parliament is a very important one.

[Michnik] I see a different division. There is a different type of sensibility and a different style of battle. There is a sensibility that is more contestational and more conservative in nature, that prefers to live in security over living by risk, that opts for what Popper calls an open society or a closed society. Such divisions seem to me to be accurate.

[Paradowska] And in terms of group interests and problems?

[Michnik] Yes, in those terms too, for there is such a thing as a private group interest of rural areas, of the highly industrialized working class, and of the emerging middle class. The various forces will respond to these interests in various ways. Add to this the traditional divisions, the divisions of political culture, and also the divisions based upon what awaits us now—quarrels over the shape of the state. Is it to be religion-based or secular, should it have a parliamentary democracy or a strong presidency? I expected changes of position in ahead of us.

[Paradowska] The argument over whether the state should be founded on religion is already going on and tonight speaking, we know the positions on this matter.

[Michnik] In my opinion, the division on this issue has not yet been fully revealed. For the present these are generalizations and declarations. For example, I am not happy with the declarations made by prominent persons that no one is calling for a religion-based state because no one is calling for bishops to be ministers and for priests to be senators. That is absurd. A religion-based state under Polish conditions is a state in which the totality of public life will be essentially subordinated to Catholic doctrine and to church institutions. What does it matter if a director of a school declares his independence if, in fact, catechism plays a principal role in the school? On the other hand, as a reaction to this type of use of the role of the church by political groups, an aggressive anticlericalism may also occur, an anticlericalism that I call a "trolley" sort of anticlericalism, which is obscurantist in nature and expresses collective frustration by attacking the church as an element of the authority, of the establishment.

Real divisions will be manifested when it comes time to decide about the method to adopt in carrying out a difficult economic policy, and no one has proposed another method, not Prof. Kurowski and not Deputy Bugaj. There are two possible ways to introduce this policy, either through pacts between major political forces or by seeking conquest (this may be understood in various ways). No other route exists. It will again be a great dilemma for political forces, a real dilemma.

[Paradowska] In your opinion, are we closer today to a pact or to conquest? The proposals presented by the UD are being quite unilaterally rejected by other groups.

[Michnik] I still see a political pact as possible, although in reality I do not see that the political will exists to conclude this pact. However, the situation is changing, the state of the economy is worsening, and Party X has arisen. This party is a black hole about which we know nothing, and its language and rhetoric are shocking. I do not believe that we should become hysterical over this, but we cannot make light of the experiences of the presidential elections. Perhaps this will act as an incentive to moderate the past aggressiveness of the PC.

[Paradowska] Do you have in mind an understanding between the UD and the PC?

[Michnik] The activists of the PC are not the heroes of my romance novel, but a political force that exists. If in the PC and in the UD a tendency arises toward concluding a pact in the name of superior values, then I cannot reject them out of aesthetic disgust—I must accept them in the name of the good of the state. I doubt, on the other hand, that there will be room in such a system for me, but that is not important. What is important is the building of a mechanism to support the process of transformation in Poland. And what is possible? In the year 1985 I wrote a book *Those Times*, in which I said that a compromise with the communists is possible. For the majority of the Solidarity camp and for the communists as well, such a manner of thinking was simply a mental aberration. However, in a certain historical situation, compromise did emerge as a possibility.

[Paradowska] Thank you for the interview.

Dragan Paper Comments on Iordache Motion

91BA0857B Timisoara RENASTEREA BANULI IN I
in Romanian, 29 May 91 pp 1 - 7

[Article by Valentin Iordachescu: "Is the Motion a Delayed Bomb?"]

[Text] Not only the prefect of Timis, but one of the county's representatives in Parliament has been claiming the attention of the political observers. Meaning Mr. Claudiu Iordache.

Having been appointed by the prime minister to head the National Salvation Front [FSN], for a while he was viewed as the latter's man, especially since he succeeded Professor N.S. Dumitru, who had previously been picked up by the president for a similar position. The latter was replaced in the wake of the dissatisfaction caused by the way in which he led the investigation of the tragic events in Tirgu Mures, but before it became known that he was one of the FSN members involved in organizing billeting and catering for the miners during their latest sojourn in Bucharest.

Mr. Iordache surprised the observers by his symbolical moral scrutiny, his withdrawal from the FSN leadership, his ostentatious absence from the national convention, and by his many confusing statements to the press, including one in which he accused his own political party of using nationalism as a scapegoat. When it became clear that he was not endorsing the dissidence to the left of the FSN either, it was said that he represented the FSN's "Naive Wing."

However, it was his other qualities that stunned many of his bench colleagues in the Assembly of Deputies when he presented his famous motion requesting the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate the Securitate files of the country's current rulers.

Peasant Party Deputy Constantin Constantinescu attempted to reinforce the motion but in fact ended by diluting it with his request to purge the former Communist leaders, which was nothing but an additional attempt to bring back to the agenda point 8 of the Timisoara Proclamation, which failed to live up to the exaggerated hopes pinned on it by its authors.

In its 16 May issue ROMANIA LIBERA carried a list of the Parliament members [MP's] who endorsed the motion; their number had at that time reached 134 and was believed to be growing. Recently EXPRES MAGAZIN published the list of those who had not yet signed it.

What was even more surprising than the motion itself was the declaration of SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] Director Virgil Magureanu, who declared himself willing to cooperate in such an investigation. So far the issue has not been discussed in Parliament, unless it was behind the closed doors of the Permanent Bureau of the Assembly of Deputies, which Mr. Claudiu Iordache addressed, thereby committing a protocol solecism. On

the other hand, there has been progress in the debates on the controversial draft bill on national security, which has already been passed in the Senate in the absence of the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] members, who were of the opinion that the word "separatism," in the context of antinational actions, was discriminatory. The Chamber accepted a proposal to discuss the version already passed in the Senate, probably in order to preempt the calvary of fierce debates in the upper house. The haste with which the majority adopted the bill in question and the silence that enveloped the motion—much to the puzzlement of the press—prompted one UDMR MP, supported by a good number of his colleagues in the opposition, to wonder what effect this bill could still have after the adoption of another bill which decreed, among other things, that the Securitate archives were to be sealed for a duration of 90 years. It seems that the MP's, including the opposition MP's, are showing more than moderate enthusiasm for the Iordache motion. The jovial deputy from Cluj, Mr. Ion Ratiu, who, having suffered a stinging defeat in the presidential election made it by a nose into a house where he is more constructive than his party colleagues, is not hiding his apprehension—which he confided in an interview—that the investigations envisaged by the motion may be carried out in an uneven manner: fiercely in the case of the opposition, and leniently in the case of the incumbents.

The opposition press, however, is exultant. "A document that Romania needed" was for example the hard-to-dispute title of a commentary in the weekly EXPRES. Why then so many delays, since no one has so far claimed anything to the contrary? Because the motion may have incalculable consequences. We have to remember that Chancellor Helmut Kohl's east German partner in the German unification has disappeared from the political arena—although he had been offered a governmental position in the postunification cabinet—in the wake of disclosures concerning his contacts with Honecker's much feared secret police, the Stasi. Poland's interior minister, Henryk Jablonski, told the Sejm that he would never disclose the identity of the agents and informers of the former SB [Security Service], because innocent people whose names had been filed by zealous functionaries but who had never been recruited could be labeled as secret agents. Such files are not being opened in either Germany or Czechoslovakia because that could spread suspicion and create an unbearable social atmosphere. People are seeking reconciliation, not division. In our case, if the most exaggerated rumors, according to which one in two people were more or less fervent Securitate collaborators are true, who would be left without a stain? And who would be left in Parliament? Perhaps only the former political prisoners like Messrs. Dan Lazarescu, Sorin Botez, Radu Ciuceanu, Ion Diaconescu, Radu Campeanu, or Ionel Sandulescu. But who can guarantee that there were no collaborators even behind bars? Although this possibility strikes us as rather absurd. Despite all the accusations of incompetence or demagoguery, justified or otherwise, leveled at many

deputies and senators, we must in all reason admit that this first freely elected parliament (in such a long time) is superior in both intellectual quality and sobriety to the (now) provisional parliament and to any of the grand national assemblies. And that being the case, it must be morally superior to them too.

Nevertheless this motion is welcome. The country has a right to know who its rulers are in Parliament, in the government and in the judiciary. As an allegedly 80-year old worker who had been polled said in Mr. Ratiu's column (HUMAN 1): "When their turn in the microphone comes in Parliament, they can talk without being asked." Nothing brings common sense remark. The matter is too serious to be disposed of in this manner. Because at the extreme, the motion may result in a new consultation of the electorate. However, it seems that early elections are not the way, being not desirable to the opposition because opinion polls do not as yet favor it, and to the majority because it hopes to regain its popularity after the first positive effects of the reform.

This is probably the reason for the silence enclosing the "Judelele Motion".

Events of 13-15 Jun 1990 Recalled

Student Leader's Analysis

*Interviewed by the author, ROMANIA LIBERTY
on 20 June 1991 at the author's home.*

(Interview with student leader Mihai Gheorghiu by Ramona Stancu, Brumariu, place and date not given). The Youth Calling Stay in the Past. They Must Logically Advance. []

[Text] [Brumariu] A year has passed since those tragic days in June. What are your thoughts on the days of 13-15 June 1990 in the light of the past year?

[Gheorghiu] What I can tell you one year after 13-15 June is that we don't now know any more than we did in the days immediately following those events. The truth has not come in light yet and no one was made responsible either morally or in court. Everything is hanging in air. That covers both the guilty and the victims. We don't know either the real number of victims or their names, and we don't know the names of those who organized all that violence.

[Brumariu] How's that number of casualties is not known either. But you have any pitying with the money after 10-15 June of June 1990?

[Gheorghiu] Yes, at that an unscheduled meeting in Brasov last year, we met with a delegation of Ion Văduva miners who said only that they now would like to find out who was really responsible and who is hiding behind all the occurs of 13-15 June. They also said that the miners had come to Bucharest frightened by what was going on in the capital.

[Brumariu] I tried to find out what the situation had been showing?

[Gheorghiu] Yes, to what they had seen in the country but also to what the authorities, press was saying at that time. That press was indeed a factor, perhaps the most powerful factor responsible for realizing what really happened and for instigating some people against others without any reason.

[Brumariu] Do you think that 13-15 June marked a turning point for the later development of Romania's social and political life?

[Gheorghiu] Yes, it was a very important event, first of all because it said very much about what is happening in Romania; we must not forget that 13-15 June in fact marked the end of the University Senate, i.e. the end of a very significant phenomenon after December 1989 and that the violent end of that phenomenon clearly demonstrated both the mechanism of the power installed in Romania and the inability of this power to establish a genuine democracy. That was the moment at which the regime defined itself. And the regime continues to bear that mark.

[Brumariu] Is there now an element of breaking away from the December 1989-June 1990 period?

[Gheorghiu] The moment itself was very depressing and for a long while after that many people thought that nothing could be done anymore and that all was lost. Paradoxically, however, although it marked a rift, Romania's politics after June 1990 did not progress along the lines of a radicalization of the opposition (or of greater coherence and unity among the opposition). Both on the side of the authorities and on the side of the opposition the situation continued as it had been, rather than undergoing a breaking away.

[Brumariu] What about all the psychological effects?

[Gheorghiu] Psychologically, something extremely serious happened and at least the young generation reacted very strongly. That is when the exodus of the young people began. That was the point that convinced many people that it was better to leave and try their luck in other countries. This exodus is a very grave phenomenon for our society.

[Brumariu] Have the students lost their interest for what is happening around them?

[Gheorghiu] Some of them, more than a few, who entertained very high hopes and who thought that the situation would progress smoothly, distanced themselves from public life. At the same time it is clear that some, perhaps fewer than the former, are becoming more radical. They probably realized at that point that their action was beneficial and necessary, that nothing could be done without them, and that they were and must be the ones to assume the responsibility for both political and civic and cultural initiative in the society.

[Brumariu] Did that contribute to a better organization of the students?

[Gheorghiu] It was a different type of action, less obvious. The experience of the revolution and of the 13-15 June events made many become wiser. That was something extraordinary, because we realized that we were in the midst of a struggle that was not only political, but also a struggle between generations, a struggle against everything that was old and everything that is dragging this society back. The conflict permeating the Romanian society became more pronounced. While in December it may have seemed that we were all on the same side and that we were all pursuing the same goal, in June we realized that there were great differences, that some were pulling in one direction and others in another, and that something had to be done to reunite and coherence.

[Brumariu] What are you doing in practice?

[Gheorghiu] In practice, first of all we continued to organize the various student organizations, in spite of the threat that has been hovering over our organizations since June 1990. We continued to organize out of a kind of obstinate desire to do things that we exist and that we have something to say.

[Brumariu] What are the relations between the students organizations and the students in general and the opposition?

[Gheorghiu] These student organizations incorporate only a small percentage of the student population. The relations between these organizations and the opposition are not very clear. There are common goals and there is mutual trust, but there are no common actions. It may be more interesting to find out what are the relations of the young generation with the organized forms of opposition. It is true that since the June events there has been a drop in the presence of the youth in other nonstudent organizations. Something bad has happened. The youth have lost faith in the political effectiveness of such organizations, perhaps they have lost faith even in their own forces. On the other hand, it is clear that without the young generation's actions and without its presence in political and cultural organizations and in every aspect of Romania's public life, the situation will not get on a good track. Young people have no psychological, personal, or intimate reason to linger somewhere in the past; they can only go forward. They cannot linger in either a painful past or in a past of fear and compromise, like others. They logically go forward. It is true that there is great confusion and mistrust among the youth. People can rally only around an idea. December 1989, University Square, and some other of last year's events showed that beneficial political and social phenomena can be created only around an idea. At this time people are beginning to realize what is happening and everything is becoming clear.

[Brumariu] Is there any memory from those days that haunts you?

[Gheorghiu] The violence that marked those events was extraordinary, but even more cruel than the physical ill-treatment of many of the students at the University and the Institute of Architecture were two other terrible things: the fact that some of the people of Bucharest obviously approved of it and felt satisfaction about the violence, and about strangers coming in and brutally punishing people. They didn't know either who we were or why we were being punished, but those people's satisfaction about the unleashed violence was much worse than the miners' violence. And then there was the emotional violence, the threat to our entire system of representation, to our entire system of values, and to the moral phenomenon of the University Square, which was very serious. The University Square meant very much, especially to the young, the reality that you could say what you believed, that your voice could be heard, that you had at least that freedom. 13-15 June brought a violent, brutal end to that belief. It was in fact a violence against one's intimate being, against souls and minds. That aggression was the worst.

Witnesses Interviewed

*(BR 1984 "Bucuresti" [INTERVIEW] LIBER
de Romania 15-16 June 91 pp. 1-4)*

[Article by Cristina Rahint and Diana Simion: "What Would You Do if the Miners Came Back to Bucharest?"]

[Text] "What would you do if the miners came back to Bucharest?" our reporters asked. Passersby answered:

Florica Hornicar, housewife: "What would I do? I like last year, I would talk to them. There were some handsome young ones among them. I got along with them. I said: 'Go to the University and clean up the place, because they're up to dirty tricks there, even the Bulgarians laugh at them.' Nobody beat me up, none of the miners, so I'm not afraid of them. I don't think they killed any innocent people, like the newspapers kept lying. Some people did curse at the miners well, those were picked up in vans. People threw flower pots at their heads from some paratent buildings. That was then. Now there's no reason for them to come. I hope."

Razvan Ionescu, student: "Why should the miners come? Is anyone calling them in? I don't think that a monumental blunder like last year's could be repeated. We complain that we are isolated, that European for a are blocking financial aid to us, but we forget that it is all the outcome of the atrocities of 13-15 June, when the state of law ceased to exist in Romania. Now, in 1991, the miners wouldn't come to Bucharest even if they were begged, I'm positive. The savagery with which they beat up innocent people last year, especially students, gave them a bad conscience even if they didn't admit it. Once again, I am convinced that they wouldn't come again regardless of what was happening."

Ion Oancea, miner: "I didn't go then. I was scared. I had a feeling it would end up badly, that there would be fighting. You think the miners on their own knew where

... find people from those parties?" If they hadn't been stayed, even stayed, we wouldn't now be ashamed to say we're miners. I thank God I wasn't swept in the wave and didn't go to Bucharest. Today I would be even less inclined to go. Not even if they forced me. That's what I think. I don't want to have to be ashamed of myself and my profession!

Vasile Constantinescu, retired: "It's a senseless question. You abused the miners every which way in the papers, but I don't think they were that guilty. I admit that on 13/15 June (1990) I stayed away from University Square. I heard about the beatings, but the television didn't show anything. I heard about it from a nephew who was in Italy. He was horrified by what he saw on Italian television. I can't tell you how I would react because I rule out a second visit by the miners to Bucharest. They've had time to wake up, too, in the past year.

Ana Florea, worker: "Instead of writing that we don't have anything, that the money does not stretch far enough, and that we're afraid of losing our jobs, you ask about the miners. That's all in the past. People made mistakes, for which we paid and we'll still be paying a heavy toll, because wreaths were laid in front of the National Theater. If the miners came again I would turn my cheek and say: 'What gives you the right to beat up innocent children, old people, and women?' You better go to work and show some production, because if you keep on like that we won't have any fuel. Without working you have no right to demand high pay!"

Dan Preda, planner: "Lady, don't remind me of the miners nightmare... It was the most brutal possible slap in the face of this country. The political ignorance of the president and his haste will go down in history... It was perhaps the most unnatural thing that happened since 23 August 1944. To me, thanking the vandals who darkened Romania's image in the world was an unspeakable gesture totally uncalled for. I can't think what the reaction would be today. I'm trying to forget what happened last year. It's very tough."

Dana P., economist: "First of all, I don't think we'll have the pleasure of seeing the miners in Bucharest again. Second, I would ask them who was footing the bill for their 'spontaneous' trip, and third, I would try, without too much chance of success, to find out how many of them were really miners. I suspect you realize it's a sci-fi scenario."

Angela, schoolgirl: "I can't stand to hear any more talk of miners. They did enough last year, let them pay for their sins and look in the mirror every day and wonder, 'What did I do in Bucharest?' Who gained by it?" Certainly not Romania."

Dorina Popescu, unemployed: "Do you really think they'd come again?" If they did, I think they'd gather in front of the government to express thanks for the wise management of the state wealth and for the wealth of commodities with which they flooded us, so much that

we don't have enough money to buy up everything. I was taking that's all I have left. I don't have a job, nor much chance of getting one, so the miners are the last thing on my mind.

Georgeta, schoolgirl, 8 years old: "We played miners and students like at the University, but we didn't fight that badly. I'm afraid of them. Last year I walked with my mother through the Square the next day, on the 14th, and we barely got away. Mother told them to stop kicking the students, and they got angry at her and cursed her very badly. From what I heard at home, the miners won't come again to Bucharest.

B. Mircea, student: "Although I got away unhurt at the time, I wouldn't want to live through such days again. I was downtown and I saw it. They had iron bars, chains, axes, stones. There was blood, yes, blood on the pavement and on people's faces. And the police were 'guarding' the peace... I was a coward, I didn't get involved. I was scared, probably because I had seen some of the people they beat up. But if I landed in the same situation again, I wouldn't stay away. I would try to intervene and to make them understand that this kind of 'order,' established with chains and clubs, with blood and stones, couldn't last."

Elena Nemet, worker, Cluj: "I heard many people say, 'Good for them!' I think there's no need for any further explanations, even the miners have realized that what happened then was not good at all. They're going to mind their business and they won't let themselves be dragged (if that was the case) into such things. I don't think that another 13-15 June's possible."

Magarel, homeless child, around the Northern Train Station: "The miners gave me bread, but I didn't eat it. I threw it away! I don't need their bread. They beat people up mercilessly, like they beat us up at the center for minors. When you're miserable and no one helps you, like the people were at the University, and other people even come to beat you up, I know, you feel sad for the whole world and for God, but there's nothing you can do, you have to take it... If the miners came again I would stay away. I don't want to see them and I don't want their bread!"

Stefania Florian, housewife: "No, for sure the miners won't come again to Bucharest. In fact, I dare them. I may be a woman, but I'd wallop one of them so he'd remember me!"

Viorica Brasoveanu, student: "No, the miners won't come to Bucharest now. Now the students are going to the Jiu Valley. There is only one difference. The students are not carrying either clubs, or chains, or stones. Only goodwill, love for the other, and friendship. We must put our hopes in the good auspices of concord."

Marcel Coriolan, joint-cab driver: "If they come like last year I think I'll have at least one traffic accident. You got

me? I won't give up until I've broken at least one miner's arm. But I don't think we'll ever see a trace of a miner in Bucharest again!"

Vlad P., engineer: "Well, the miners have no business in Bucharest anymore. Now they have their own problems. Less money and increasingly empty baskets. So they no longer have a reason to please the authorities. Last time they didn't get anything either for terrorizing the capital."

Brasov County Police Chief on Gypsy Crime

*9/18/88 "A Brasov GAZETA DE TRANSILVANIA
(a) Romanian (1 May 1991) p. 12*

[Article by Colonel Nicolae Neagu, Brasov County police chief: "The Gypsies: An Artificial, Extrapolated Problem in Brasov County"]

[Text] I would not have tackled this really sensitive topic if it had not been for the county media, which has been falling into the temptation of debating—sometimes in editorial articles—the alleged threat posed by the Gypsy community on the territory of Brasov County. Of course, my intervention is not intended as an apology for this minority ethnic group, but as an attempt to clear up a few of the facts concerning the daily realities and the integration of the Gypsies living in our county localities. Without claiming to arrive at definitive, scientific, and categorical conclusions, I will try to clarify the ethiology and forms of manifestation of crimes and other antisocial acts committed by some of the members of that community.

I find it opportune to stress the incontestable and inescapable permanence of the Gypsies in this area. This fact bears on the need to accept their right to live and work here, to take up permanent or temporary residence, to establish families, to unrestrictedly participate in socio-economic activities, and so forth. We cannot entertain the idea of excluding them or isolating them to inaccessible areas.

We must also consider the current percentage of Gypsies in the total population of the county because, according to police estimates, they make up approximately 55,000 to 60,000 adults and minors, i.e., 8 to 9 percent of the county population. While only slightly over 1,000 Gypsies live in the county seat (Brasov being the largest "clean" city in the country from this viewpoint), in towns like Sacele, Zarnesti, Codlea, Risnov, Fagaras, and in over 20 communes they make up a considerable percentage, sometimes over 50 percent, and their presence constitutes the preponderant aspect of life and tradition.

In contrast to other areas and localities in the country, the life of the Gypsies in our county has acquired significant specific characteristics. Worth noting is the fact that, in contrast to many other areas, in our county there are no nomadic or seminomadic groups or groups organized according to trades and occupations. Ethnic

Gypsies in our county are registered, most of them went to general schools, learned a trade, and are employed in useful activities.

Although because of a policy of ignoring, rejecting, and isolating this community most of the Gypsies settled in housing in peripheral neighborhoods of our towns and communes, and although there was and there still is obvious discrimination in hiring for highly qualified jobs and functions, more than a few members of this ethnic group have penetrated all the spheres of economic, social, and cultural activities.

Nevertheless, we have to note and admit that precisely against the background of this relative isolation, the community's standard of living, education, civilization, knowledge, and of observing the law and rules of behavior fall below the national average; they rank lower in the area of education and higher with respect to antisocial acts committed.

I will attempt to provide official figures and data to illustrate the situation that prevailed in 1990-91 in our county. Thus, of the 2,597 crimes recorded throughout the county, 101 were committed by Gypsies, for a total of 6.8 percent of the total.

On the other hand, of all the 1,924 persons investigated, 101 were Gypsies, for a total of 5.2 percent of the felons.

As for violent crimes, of a total of 156 felons only 17 were Gypsies. Most of them committed acts of robbery and assault. The thefts recorded can be traced back to the great neediness of this community, while the spontaneous acts of violence, recorded as a rule in public places, betray a tendency to give a violent expression to primitive instincts against the background of a low standard of culture and education and of the continuation of entirely specific ethnic and cultural traditions.

The same problems, causes, and conditions were responsible, are responsible, and will certainly continue to influence for a long time to come the anarchist and hooliganic reactions and manifestations of certain groups of Gypsies or some of their members. We note that Gypsies were responsible for about 35 percent of the acts of hooliganism and aggravated injury, and that severe punishment measures and sentences were and continue to be pronounced against them.

We also noted that members of the population in question are accountable for a disproportionate share of thefts from public and private property. They were found accountable for approximately 15 percent of the thefts, most frequently thefts of livestock and fowl, food, pickpocketing, bicycles, both off the assembly line and in the fields. We also find Gypsies among the receivers of stolen goods from enterprises, especially copper, aluminum, and other metal sheets and wire.

An analysis of the crime phenomenon clearly shows that the Gypsies are not responsible for the most serious crimes and rapes; they are not the planners of the most

sophisticated home and car burglaries; they do not plan and carry out crimes involving fakes and swindles, nor do they engage in arms, ammunition, and drugs trafficking which is so well disguised that the broad public is mostly unaware of it. They are, however, responsible for trashing public areas, black marketeering, begging, and vagrancy; they move around in noisy groups, their dress is an eyesore, and their behavior is a source of stress. Aren't these a sign of obvious lack of culture and education, as is even their reaction to the ostentative differences separating them from the other categories of the public?

Is the situation in Brasov so much more dramatic than in other areas and localities in the country? Do we have a right to banish these people from our society? Is isolating them the best solution? Should we, Romanians, who claim to be among the most tolerant nations, stigmatize and even unjustly accuse these fellowmen who, nevertheless, have the same rights to live?

We must admit the rhetoric of these questions and the patent falsity of the purpose for which we are raising them, and we must genuinely consider what we can do to smooth out minor antagonisms and conflicts. Naturally, not by tolerating or forgiving anyone guilty of abusive or aggressive behavior, nor anyone who takes what is not rightly theirs, nor anyone who tries to disturb the peace and quiet of our community. On the contrary. But we must keep in mind the fact that we need to coexist and interact and we must create decent living conditions, sufficient and acceptable jobs and occupations, decent

pay for heads of families, and minimal educational conditions for the Gypsies at least equal to those offered the other minorities.

Last but not least, we invite the members of the Gypsy community themselves to promote authentic leaders and cultural traditions, to organize the education of their children and youth, and to influence the behavior of their entire community.

As a policeman I never discriminated between Gypsies and other groups under investigation for violating the law. I looked upon them with sufficient tolerance and compassion and tried to understand their needs and pain, their limitations and handicaps in comparison with others who committed the same acts even though they were not hungry. Showing these people a bit more kindness was certainly not proof of lack of severity. In so acting I tried to give them a feeling that they belonged to our collectivity and that they have a place in this community, whose laws, rules, morals, and traditions they must, however, respect.

As head of this restructured institution that is the County Police, I treated every antisocial act committed by Gypsies with severity. I established the most rapid possible system of operational intervention. I ordered every act investigated, and I proposed penal and criminal measures in keeping with each individual case. This is the working style of all our subunits, whose duty it is to apply the letter and spirit of the law. The police will be capable of eliminating fear, aversion, the threat of intolerance, and undesirable conflicts. From this point of view, Brasov can and must offer a unique experience in the Romanian landscape.

Issue of Irregularity of Tudjman Presidency

91BA08504 Belgrade: NEDELJNA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 22-23 Jun 91 p.2

[Article by D. Belic: "Tudjman—Acting"]

[Text] Is Dr. Franjo Tudjman a temporary president of the Republic of Croatia, i.e., an acting Croatian president? Judging by the letter of the constitution—the Croatian one, naturally—it seems that he is.

In the last few days this fact has been pointed out—in an extremely bashful and very cautious manner, admittedly—by individual journalistic analysts in Croatia, and a similar position can be heard, also in an extremely restrained manner, among a few Croatian opposition leaders. To put it simply, Dr. Tudjman is holding the office of president of the Republic, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, although he has not, in accordance with those same provisions, passed through the normal presidential election procedure which is stipulated at any rate by the constitutional provisions in question.

A short prehistory of Tudjman's current office could be reduced to several lines: After the victory of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] in the parliamentary elections in Croatia somewhat more than a year ago, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, as the head of the party, was elected president of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia by the Assembly, as was stipulated by the Croatian constitution at that time. With the adoption of the so-called Christmas Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the office of the President of the Republic was established in December 1990. Under the provisions of the constitution a presidential election procedure is necessary to fill this position. In the meantime, during these six months Tudjman has been exercising all the constitutional authority given him by the office of President of the Republic, but he has not entered any presidential elections.

One can hardly assume that Dr. Franjo Tudjman would not be elected president of the Republic of Croatia, in spite of certain surveys which indicate that the most popular politician in "our beautiful country" is Stipe Mesic (simply, since both of them belong to the same party, the party leadership could make a decision that the HDZ would only offer its top leader as a candidate). The essential issue, however, is something else: The office of President of the Republic, after the elections, would obligate Tudjman to deprive himself of his first position as head of the party, and it seems that he and many others would by no means want this. In this way he can use his authority to prevent the increasingly more frequent divisions within the HDZ, and at the same time hold the office of head of the Croatian state as if he had passed through regular presidential elections.

If someone criticizes him in this regard for being only a temporary president of the Republic for so long now, he will do so with a great deal of restraint, without major

consequences—just as it is rare that anyone criticizes the ruling Croatian party for not having scheduled regular parliamentary elections six months after the adoption of the new Croatian constitution, as had been stipulated.

But perhaps Dr. Tudjman is only waiting for Croatia to become an independent and autonomous state before 30 June, so that he can then enter presidential elections with the aura of a real "father of his country"?

Division of Bosnia Not in Interest of Croatia

91BA08604 Zagreb: DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian
18 Jun 91 pp.16-17

[Article by Radovan Pavic: "All the Bosnian Shades of Difference"]

[Text] The idea of the division of B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] stands as a counterpoint to the idea of "expanded Croatia" and "expanded Serbia," which swallow it whole. The participants in that division might be Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro or only some of them; everything, of course, depends on the balance of power, but it is difficult to believe that there would only be one participant in the division: One attracts and arouses another, and in the end the division is thorough.

Although we believe that in essence the division of Bosnia has nothing good to offer, the consequences are still ambivalent: On the one hand, territory is swallowed up, but on the other, ethnic composition is simplified, and this is done to the advantage of the Muslim population, which is in the majority even today.

The idea of Croatia being a participant in the division of B-H is actually not very relevant today. To be sure, in the election campaign there were views distinguished by their vagueness ("natural and historical borders of Croatia"), and there were also those who aspired to B-H, but only as a reaction to possible encroachments by "expanded Serbia," i.e., this was a logical defensive pronouncement, because Croatia could never consent to parts of B-H with a distinct Croat majority entering an "expanded Serbia." Nevertheless, this is now history—Croatia today stands firmly on the position of the integrity of B-H and the idea that it belongs only to itself and that everything depends on the decisions of the citizens there. It is understandable that the idea of division of B-H could be attractive to Croat extremists, but let us examine this from the realistic viewpoints both of Croatia and of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only areas in western Herzegovina are pertinent as those which might be annexed to Croatia.

Welcome Croats, Farewell Croats

This would enlarge Croatia by 3,888 km (the opstinas of Livno, Duvno, Posusje, Grude, Liscica, Ljubuski, Citluk, Capljina, and Neum, in which the percentage of Croats ranges from 53.5 to 99.1 percent, with an overall average of 85.1 percent), which have a total population of 203,168, 172,703 of them Croats, and it would deepen

its own state territory toward the interior. It is true that this would be favorable for Croats, because the relative share of Croats in Croatia would after all increase, and that from 75.1 to 75.5 percent, and the percentage of Serbs would drop, but at the same time the number of Croats in B-H would be considerably reduced (from 758,136 to 585,343), which could only make their situation more difficult in the context of the remainder of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is more, annexing a portion of B-H to Croatia would also result in an inevitable seizure by Serbia, and in view of the character of Serbian expansionist encroachments, in which there is no room for shades of difference as to whether the Serbs are a majority or minority in a particular place, it would obviously be sizable. What is more, of course, Croatia would largely lose B-H as a buffer and bulwark, which is extremely dangerous in view of the proximity of eastern Herzegovina, with its majority Serb population and the narrow Croatian coastal zone in the vicinity of Dubrovnik. The integrity of B-H, then, is in Croatia's vital interest and a proper aspect of Croatian policy, and the possible annexation of western Herzegovina by Croatia could only result from extremely tumultuous conditions, and here it is worth bearing in mind that the destiny of other Croats in B-H must then be considered sealed.

The view of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], to the effect that the division of B-H is possible, at least in the sense of certain parts (Bosanska Krajina) achieving political autonomy, actually becoming a state—B-H thereby losing its space while eastern Herzegovina could be annexed to Montenegro—stands against the view that is generally accepted today in Croatia. The idea of the integrity of B-H is not acceptable to the SDS. The SDS could not be dominant in a democratized B-H, especially not if the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and the HDŽ [Croatian Democratic Community] prove to be identical; then the integrity of B-H prevents the transformation of both Bosanska Krajina and the border sections of Croatia into a separate autonomy/state ("Krajina," actually West Serbia), while Montenegro, as a part of Serbia, or in a community with Serbia, cannot include eastern Herzegovina—and all of that is important because it cancels out the ultimate objective of Serbian expansionist claims, i.e., the formation of an "expanded Serbia."

Taking everything into account, let us examine the possible versions of "internal" and "external" division of B-H.

Internal division: First, autonomization of Bosanska Krajina and eastern Herzegovina constitutes an internal division and is the mildest form of the division of B-H—it is thereby reduced by 21,124 km, or 41.32 percent (Bosanska Krajina represents 16,569 km of that area, and eastern Herzegovina 4,555), and it compacts the Serbs, which means that the ethnic distribution of the rest of B-H changes. Without those sections, B-H has a population of 2,966,337, of which 1,261,438, or 42.53 percent, are Muslims; 744,771, or 25.11 percent, are

Serbs; and 668,552, or 22.54 percent, are Croats. These numbers are important if we bear in mind that undivided B-H has 1,629,924 Muslims (39.5 percent), 1,320,644 Serbs (32 percent), and 758,136 Croats (18.4 percent) (1981 figures). Following these changes, B-H remains intact in its area, but that is only a formality, because it is clear that the autonomous political structures of Serbs actually signify *de facto* statehood.

Krajina Without Conditions

However, certain conditions must exist for the autonomization of B-H; that is, there must be appropriate quantities, which is to say that the share of any ethnos must exceed 50 percent for cultural autonomy, 66 percent (that is the ratio of 2:1) for political autonomy, and 75 percent (or a ratio of 3:1) for secession.

Let us see, then, how matters stand with western Bosnia (Bosanska Krajina together with Bihać-Cazin Krajina) and eastern Herzegovina. When we look at the relative numbers, we see immediately that western Bosnia, with a 49.2-percent proportion of Serbs, does not have the conditions even for cultural autonomy, except in the case when cultural autonomy (with good reason) is determined on the basis of a plurality (relative majority). The situation is more favorable for the Serbs if we omit from western Bosnia the distinctly Muslim sector (Bihać-Cazin Krajina, that is, the opstinas of Velika Kladusa, Cazin, Bihać, and Bosanska Krupa) with a total population of 223,403, of which 173,061 are Muslims (77.47 percent) and 29,404 Serbs (13.16 percent). Then the share of Serbs in western Bosnia does increase to almost 59 percent, but it is clearly evident that even if the Bihać-Cazin Krajina is excluded, the Serbs still do not have the conditions for political autonomy, much less secession, that is, for formation of any separate federal unit, and any talk about that can only be an expression of the imperial encroachments of Serbian expansionism.

The situation is similar in eastern Herzegovina (the opstinas of Kalinovik, Nevesinje, Gacko, Bileća, Ljubinje, and Trebinje). That area as a whole, which is considered Serb, has the conditions for cultural and political autonomy (about 66 percent Serbs), but by no means for secession, because only two opstinas (Bileća and Ljubinje) have more than 75 percent Serbs. As for northeastern Bosnia (Semberija), in which three opstinas (Bijeljina, Ugljevik, and Lopare) have an absolute majority of Serbs (59.3 percent), the conditions exist for cultural autonomy, but for nothing more than that. It is interesting to recall that the Croats in western Herzegovina, although they go furthest in meeting the conditions for autonomy (a proportion of 85.1 percent), and that not only cultural, but also political, are not seeking autonomization as a solution of their status in B-H.

External division implies the participation of Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia in the division of B-H. As we have already said, division/secession requires at least two essential criteria, i.e., continuous borders and a sufficient proportion (75 percent). It is accordingly clear

that eastern Hercegovina and northeastern Bosnia (Semberija) do have a position with a continuous border, but they do not have sufficient quantities (about 66 and 59.3 percent Serbs, respectively). There remains, then, the problem of western Bosnia (and of the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina) and western Hercegovina. However, western Bosnia and the so-called SAO Krajina do not have continuity of territorial borders with Serbia, nor do they have a sufficient proportion of Serbs, because that proportion is only 52.4 percent. But if we omit from that area the number and territory of the Muslims, the proportion of Serbs would increase, but that would cause such territorial problems in drawing borders that it makes no sense to even entertain that possibility. Western Bosnia and the so-called SAO Krajina lack, then, the conditions even to be a separate autonomous political structure or federal/confederal unit, or a part of "expanded Serbia," but they do have the conditions for cultural autonomy, which, following the logic, would not be applied to the Muslims.

The Mostar Plebiscite

Matters stand quite differently when it comes to western Hercegovina, which is the customary term for the area between the Neretva and Livanjsko Polje, which it includes. In that area, both conditions are fulfilled for secession and annexation to Croatia: that is, both the border positions and the 85.1-percent share of Croats. What is more, there is also a natural gravitational connection to the coast, which is important to the natural flow of life.

By way of conclusion, let us say that an approach which is based on scientific criteria and logic is not, unfortunately, applicable in politics as well, and that a solution can be anticipated at the level of the balance of power, and one possibility consists of a trade of both territory and population, i.e., for a portion (we emphasize "a portion") of the so-called SAO Krajina in Croatia to go to B-H, while western Hercegovina would be included in Croatia.

Mostar is a special problem in this connection, but that is a question that can be resolved by plebiscite. These possibilities are not altogether beyond reason, assuming, of course, that a civilized agreement can be reached. The supposed exchange would even have its advantages: No one would lose territory (precision and balance in quantitative terms are not so essential here), and the population would be included in its more natural ethnic framework without resettlement. In this connection, Croatia on the one hand cannot by any means withdraw its three demands, but on the other hand it must also consent to a compromise, and that means that the borders should be drawn to meet the following conditions: 1) to encompass as many Croats as possible, 2) to secure a water supply, and 3) to afford a transportation corridor (in the Skradin sector), except that the so-called SAO Krajina must nowhere reach the sea so that the territory of Croatia is nowhere divided into two parts. It is also clear that the opstinas of Obrovac and Benkovac, with 33.8

and 40.1 percent Croats, respectively, absolutely do not come into consideration for exchange. Although all three criteria have an importance which cannot be ignored, we must particularly emphasize the third (transportation corridor/outlet to the sea), because even if there were 100 percent Serbs in critical areas, that could not be decisive, because geopolitical considerations from the standpoint of the republic absolutely prevail over ethnic composition, and we should also recall that the absolute number of Serbs here is extremely small.

As far as compromise is concerned, Croatia must give up the opstina Neum, even though its Croat population represents all of 88.7 percent, and the reason is so that B-H retains its outlet to the sea.

Well, so much for insanities, but we are not dealing with insanities here, because insanities do not exist in politics. In politics, there is only—the balance of power!

Bosnian Patriotic Front for Defense Founded

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[Article by S. Numanovic: "Patriotic Front of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Civil Defense of the Republic"]

[Text] "Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] and Yugoslavia are at the midpoint of crisis from which the roads may lead either to a peaceful resolution through an equal dialogue of all the republics or to a use of force that would attempt to realize some nationalistic and expansionist concept that would certainly lead us to the cataclysm of a bloody civil war." This is the first statement that occurs in the basic document concerning the Patriotic Front of B-H, whose formation was initiated the other day by the Socialist Democratic Party [SDP] of the republic, with the support of several other political entities. The intention of the initiators was for this front to work to preserve community life, political sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and by its nature it is an organization above political parties.

The front brings together, regardless of party affiliation, those citizens who are determined to preserve the community life, political and governmental identity, integrity, and sovereignty of B-H, and who are also determined that the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina "can serve and develop the Yugoslav community" on an equal footing with the other republics. Membership in the Patriotic Front is on an individual basis, the basic document goes on to say, and the organization operates on the regional principle.

The basic document of the Patriotic Front of B-H especially emphasizes that its members, regardless of party affiliation, are "citizens who by their reputation and prestige can secure general support for further democratization of society, for peaceful resolution of all disputes, and for community life."

"In case of an aggressive violation of the territorial integrity and community life in Bosnia and Hercegovina or a part of its territory, the Patriotic Front is transformed into the Front for National Resistance of B-H, which collaborates directly with all democratic forces that are clearly committed to preserving the peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In the context of general chaos and total blockade of the operation of republic and federal bodies of government, the Front for National Resistance of B-H would work on the self-organization of the citizenry in order to reestablish order and their defense and protection," states the basic document of the Patriotic Front.

The front will fight to affirm a free and sovereign B-H as a democratic state of the citizens who live in it and that remain in the democratic Yugoslav governmental community of all six equal republics. The political basis of the front is the "Resolution on the State Sovereignty of B-H and the New Political Convention on Yugoslavia."

In a conversation concerning the Patriotic Front of B-H, Ivo Komsic says: "This is the final expression of our efforts to establish Bosnia and Hercegovina as a sovereign republic equal with the other republics in the Yugoslav community. In view of the fact that the Assembly of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as the supreme body of government, has been persistently rejecting our demands as well as the demands of other opposition parties to adopt a document in the republic Assembly, which in fact is the place for that, we have adopted an intraparty document and called upon citizens to join the Patriotic Front, because it is obvious that the last days of Bosnia and Hercegovina are running out."

Komsic interprets the refusal of the parliament to take a position on the sovereignty of B-H as an expression of the hypocrisy of the ruling parties, but he is not willing to make a direct connection between the last meeting of the

B-H parliament and the summit meeting of the three in Split on 12 June. "The B-H Assembly has consistently, from its very first day, refused to debate the sovereignty of B-H and its position within the Yugoslav community," says the vice president of the Socialist Democratic Party.

Going back to the hypocrisy of the B-H government, Komsic remarks:

"The Assembly is blocked, the government—according to its own ministers—as well. It is unthinkable for a party which is in power to form a National Defense Council, and the SDA [Democratic Action Party] is the leading party in power. Instead of that, the SDA," according to Komsic, "should use the legal instruments of government to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of B-H. After all, what the SDA is unable to do when in power, can now be done by this body, even though it is the party which has the most representatives in the government."

In answer to the question of whether possibilities exist for possible coordination of activities between the Patriotic Front and the National Defense Council which the SDA has formed, Komsic briefly replied that that possibility does not exist at present. "The Patriotic Front was established on a civil rather than an ethnic basis," we were told by the vice president of the SDP of B-H.

We should mention in conclusion that the motive for forming the Patriotic Front was the assessment of the Presidency of the Republic Committee of Reformed B-H Communists to the effect "that expansionist nationalism is unscrupulously carrying out a warmongering scenario that is passing from the phase of constantly initiating new hotbeds of political conflicts and creation of constitutional chaos and a hysteria of ethnic jeopardy and fear of others, into a phase of provoking direct armed confrontations and outright ethnic warfare."

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